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Lumley v. Gye

THE AFTERMATH: AN INDUCEMENT TO
JUDICIAL REFORM?
This area of tort is well-traversed and more than adequately described.
In order to embark on yet another discussion of the cases one needs a
reason. Mine is that by means of such a discussion I am hopeful of
demonstrating that the approved processes of judicial law-making are
unsatisfactory. I will not be concerned to show that individual cases were
wrongly decided but rather that, by adhering to the principle that all a
court can do is to interpret the existing state of the law as found in the
words used by some previous court, the judiciary is bound to bring the
judicial process into disrepute. Attempts to be true to the notion that
judges must not decide cases on the basis of social policy criteria but
must instead decide cases by applying existing formulae to particular fact
situations Ieads courts to use a strange form of logic in order that acceptable decisions can be reached by them while at the same time they cannot
be accused of overly insulting the sacrosanct principle of precedent and
consistency. But this distortion of logic1 will create pigeonholes out of
which a trial judge, bound by the doctrine of a "neutral" application of
precedent, may iind it hard to escape even though social logic demands
that he should eschew the effects of the existing formulation of the law.
The decision in Lumley v. Gye2 and its well-known subsequent history is
a good illustration of this undesirable aspect of our legal system.
This article will try to establish that Lumley v. Gye was not the forerunner of a new species of tort liability, but that it was a manifestation of

*
1

B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), (Melb.), J.D. (Chicago), Barrister and Solicitor (Vic.) ;
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Judges are by no means unaware that the precedent doctrine may need to be
"doctored". For instance, in Quinn v. Leathern [1901] A.C. 495, Lord Halsbury
said at p. 506
"[Elvery judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or
assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be
found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed
and qualified by the particular facts . . . in which such expressions are to be
found. . . . [A] case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely
deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically
from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical
code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge
- that the law is not always
. logical
at all."
In this article it will be argued that failure to recognize these sentiments as home
truths leads to difficulties.
(1853) 2 El. & B1. 216; 118 E.R. 749.
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a general cause of action which protected certain interests against interference caused by certain kinds of conduct. Further, it will be demonstrated,
the highly theoretical approach to case law interpretation by the courts
both causes remedies to be given where they should not be available and
remedies to be withheld where they should be granted. The value judgment
inherent in the last point will be spelt out and made the basis for a
recommendation as to how the courts ought to proceed in the future.

The plaintiff's declaration to which the defendant demurred in Lumley V.
Gye contained three counts. Their combined effect was that the plaintiff,
the proprietor of the Queen's Theatre and Her Majesty's Theatre, had
engaged Miss Wagner to perform for him and only for h i at his theatres
for a specified period; that the defendant knew of this arrangement and
with malicious intent, whilst the agreement between the plaintiff and
Miss Wagner was in force, wrongfully and maliciously enticed Miss Wagner
to refuse to sing or perform at the plaintiff's theatres, and to abandon her
contract with the plaintiff, as a result of which the plaintiff suffered damage.
It was held by the Queen's Bench (Coleridge 3. dissenting) that the
plaintiff had made out a good cause of action. Although it was a while
before the full impact of the decision was accepted: it came to be
regarded as the holding which established the law to be that, if a breach
of contract was procured by the act of a stranger to the contract, whether
"malicious" or not, the stranger would be liable to the promisee who had
been injured by the breach of contract committed by the promisor. Another
significant facet of the decision was that it seemed that the nature of the
contract breached was of no relevance provided the conduct of the
defendant had led directly to the breach.
The fact situation of Lumley v. Gye was peculiarly unsuited to give
rise to the creation of a new species of tort as the result did not seem to
fill in a lacuna in the legal protection for worthwhile rights, making it all
the more remarkable that it became to be regarded in that way. After all
what legal and/or social policy which was not already provided for was satisfied by deciding that the plaintiff had a cause of action against the defendant? The breach of contract by Miss Wagner plainly made her liable to the
pldntiff. Why should the plaintiff be given an additional remedy? In his
judgment in Lumley v. Gye Erle J. suggested that one reason would be
But this is
that the measure of damages in contract might be inadeq~ate.~
3

4

Thus in Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333, some 28 years later the Court of
Appeal, whilst acknowledging that there was a cause of action for procufing a
breach of contract (by a majority of two to one) did suggest that a finding of
"malice" in the defendant was essential to the establishment of the tort. It was
not until the decision in Temperton v. Russell [I8931 1 Q.B. 715, was handed
down that the doctrine as set out in the text was fully accepted,
Ibid., 234, 756,
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not a satisfactory reply. The principle of contract law is that the parties
have struck a bargain voluntarily. Hence, as the theory is that they do not
have to enter into a contractual relationship with any particular person,
they must be taken to have voluntarily taken the risk that, should there be
a breach of contract, the ensuing loss might not be made good by the party
in breach. The rationale for giving an additional remedy to the promisee
who has suffered loss cannot be spelt out from the fact that he cannot
recoup losses suffered by him when, it must be assumed, he was prepared
to run the risk of such losses when he entered into the b a r g a i ~ .An
~
alternative raison d'2tre for the granting of this remedy must be found.
Erle J. also relied on a general principle to justify his holding in Lumley
v. Gye, viz. that
"the procurement of the violation of the right is a cause of action, and
that, when this principle is applied to a violation of a right arising
upon a contract of hiring, the nature of the service contracted for is
immaterial."6
Much later the same reason for imposing liability on a stranger to a
contract was expressed as follows in a much-cited passage of Lord
MacNaghten's judgment in Quinn v. Leathem :
"[A] violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action,
and . . . it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual
relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for the
interference."
That is, Lumley v. Gye was seen as but one variant of a general principle.
Without just yet going into the nature of the kind of right that the law
will not permit to be violated, it is clear from the above quotations that
a remedy is granted to the possessor of such a right against violations
because the law wishes the acknowledged right to be respected and to
deter would-be violators by punishing actual violators. That is, inherent
in the cause of action is the notion that certain modes of behaviour are
not to be condoned and ought to be punished, even though the possessor
of the right may well have adequate remedies for the losses resulting out
of the violation of his right. That the tort action can be used to this effect
is amusingly illustrated by the case of Nash v. C ~ p e l a n d There
.~
the
To the argument that the promisor is not really in default in such circumstances,
i.e. his conduct is not the real cause of the losses suffered by the promisee, and
liability for the loss should therefore be imposed on the true procurer or cause of
the loss, all that needs to be said is that the law does not accept this argument.
As well as his action against the third party, the promisee can sue the promisor
even though he would, in the absence of the third party's inducement, have
performed the contract as required.
6 Ibid., 232, 755. See also the judgment of Wightman J. in which many instances of
acbons on the case are given which held that recovery could be had where an
unjustifiable violation to the plaintiFs interests had been committed, see particularly 238, 757-8.
7 [I9011 A.C. 495, 510.
8 (1887) 4 W.N.(N.S.W.) 41.

5
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plaintiff was a barrister-at-law who had bought a ticket entitling him to a
particular sleeping berth on a train. When he went to this sleeping berth he
found another man in occupation of it. This man turned out to be the
Minister for Lands who, having been shown the plaintiff's ticket, refused
to leave the sIeeping berth "despite the plaintiff's remonstrances". The
plaintiff sought the help of the train guard who, in reply to the plaintiff's
questioning said that Mr Copeland had "no ticket for the berth or the
train; but he's a Minister, and I can't do anything. . . . It is as much as
my billet is worth to shunt him"? The upshot was that the defendant, in
strong language, told the plaintiff that he would not give up the berth and
the plaintiff, his dignity hurt, had to sleep in a less comfortable place on
the train. The plaintiff clearly had an action against the Commissioner for
Railways in that there had been a breach by him of the contract between
him and the plaintiff. But the plaintiff equally clearly was more interested
in punishing the defendant. In charging the jury the Chief Justice told
them that the plaintiff's allegations revealed a cause of action for were
it not so
"it would be most disastrous to the public generally . . . for you would
simply be governed by the strongest, and whoever was the strongest
would prevail. . . . The law is that if a person commits a wrong of that
sort he is liable to be mulcted in damages for that wrong, and if he
commits a wrong of that sort under circumstances of insult and contumely the person so wronged is entitled to exemplary damages."1°
But the courts do not like to indulge in decision-making on the basis of
such criteria as the moral depravity or the social uselessness of the
defendant's conduct when compared to the social merit of the plaintifE's
activity. For so to do, apart from being devilishly difficult, would force
them into openly evaluating the moral or social merit of people's behaviour,
evaluations which cannot readily be made by reference to concrete,
objective criteria such as breach of an existing contract and the independent illegality of the defendant's conduct. This is not to say that courts
never have regard and, more importantly, that they never say that they
do have regard, to such criteria as malevolence, malice, spite, lack of
goodwill and the like. They do; but where it is at all possible they show
their preference for being able to find that the applicable law does not
require them to make value judgments. In the area under discussion they
have felt themselves enabled to give rein to this preference ever since the
House of Lords stated that a person may do an act which he is legally permitted to do, without fear of attracting liability for ensuing loss even if the
9

10

Ibid., 41, 42.
Ibid., 43. If it be thought that the plaintiff was motivated to sue in tort because
he might be better off that way rather than for breach of contract, that is, that
the measure of damages in contract were not likely to be adequate, note that the
jury, after a quarter of an hour's consideration, returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, damages one farthing.
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act is done with malice.ll From this pronouncement the judiciary extracted
the proposition that the significance of the cause of action which emerged
from Lumley v. Gye was that, where the right violated was a contract, the
nature of the behaviour of the stranger who procured or induced the
breach of contract did not have to be evaluated: liability would follow if
the breach was the result of the defendant's conduct, whereas if the right
interfered with was not a contract, the nature of the defendant's conduct
might make him liable although mere malice would not. That is, in respect
of breach of contract a different brand of tort liability had evolved, one in
which the emphasis was on the existence and breach of a contract. By
thus recognizing the inducing of a breach of contract as a separate, isolated
head of tort liability the courts obscured the true reason for liability in
cases such as Lumley v. Gye and eventually, therefore, were forced into
unnecessarily awkward positions when faced with analogous cases which
did not quite fit within the illogically created pigeonhole.

The view that a contract is the kind of right which will justify the imposition of liability upon a stranger should it be breached as a result of that
stranger's conduct, is supported by the respect that the common law has
evinced over the centuries for private contract-making. The contract is seen
as the cornerstone of our individualistic society. The making of contracts
depends on the ability of free activity of individuals to voluntarily treat
and to negotiate with each other and to agree to be bound to each other
on such conditions as they choose. Accordingly, its status should be
protected by the law wherever possible, thereby promoting these manifestations of individual freedom and enterprise. Thus, another way of putting
the argument (used in section I) that the reason for the Lumley v. Gye
decision was that people such as the defendant in that case ought to be
inhibited from conducting themselves so as to interfere with important
rights, is that the ability to indulge in contract-making plays such an
essential r61e in our society that it must be protected by the law. Hence,
although in terms of actual losses incurred as a result of a breach of
contract induced by a stranger, the remedies given by law and equity to
the promisee against the promisor are all that are notionally required,
public interest demands that such interference with contract-making be
11

Allen v. Flood [I8981 A.C. 1 . This holding was to lead to the drawing of a very
controversial distinction between the conduct of an individual and that of a
combination, see Quinn v. Leathern [1901] A.C. 495 and Sorrel1 v. Smith (19251
A.C. 700. In order to hold the defendants' conduct actionable in those cases, the
House of Lords not being able (or not wishing to in Quinn v. Leathern) to rely
on a finding of malice in the defendants, because of the decision in Allen v. Flood,
characterized combined activity as capable of constituting unlawful conduct in
circumstances in which similar conduct by an individual would not be so
characterized.
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more positively discouraged and, therefore, an additional remedy is given
to the promisee. Note that this gives this most fundamental of all personally
created relationship-the contract-the status of a right in rem. Indeed,
in a very important article, Professor Lauterpacht wrote that the doctrine
of Lumley v. Gye
"marks another step in the recognition of the property character of the
contractual right. And, in as much as it expressly recognizes a right of
the promisee not only against the promisor but also, in a specific sphere,
against the whole world, it is not without some effect on the traditional
distinction between rights ad rem and rights in personam."12
Thus there may be a good policy reason for treating breaches of a
contract differently from violations of other rights. But it will be clear
that if the rationale for this "tort" is to be found in awarding protection to
a public interest then the results ought to d i e r when the public interest
demands differing results; rigid adherence to objective criteria without
regard for the public interest will lead to absurdities. Accordingly, while
the courts have never openly resiled from their stated position that where
a breach of contract is the result of a stranger's act the stranger will be
liable regardless of the nature of his act, they have in fact been forced to
acknowledge many exceptions to that rule, suggesting thereby that the
action known as "inducement of a breach of contract" may not be a new
or even separate species of tort at all.

The need for a contract
McKernan v. Fraser13 is a case which exemplifies the judicial insistence
on the existence of an enforceable contract before liability can be imposed
on a defendant who interfered with the plaintiff's interests but who did
not commit an otherwise unlawful act. In that case Union A had been
deregistered as an organization under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
The plaintiffs had been members of Union A and wished it to be registered
again. They refused to pay their membership fee until the Union was
registered again. A rival association had been formed, Union B, which
the plaintiffs joined. The Adelaide Steamship Company selected eight men,
including the two plaintiffs, to work one of their ships. Officials of Union A
told the company that its members would not sail with the plaintiffs, and,
having spoken to the six members of their Union who had been selected
at the same time as the plaintiffs, these six men announced that they
would not sail with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the secretary d
Union A for, amongst other things, maliciously procuring a breach of their
contract with the company and, as an alternative, for maliciously coercing
the company into not entering into contracts with the plaintiffs. The High
Court found against the plaintiffs on the basis that no contract had been
12
13

H. Lauterpacht, "Contracts to Break a Contract" (1936) 52 L.Q.R.494, 506.
(1931) 46 C.L.R. 343.
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formed at the time that the company was told by the Union A officials that
its members would not sail with the plaintiffs. That is, in the absence of
a contract, something more than an otherwise lawful act causing a plaintiff
hardship had to be established. The case is particularly striking because it
was not easy to decide whether or not a contract had been concluded
between the shipping company and the plaintiffs.
The casual method of hiring, which was employed in this case, required
men seeking work to come and make themselves available, creating a pool
of employees from which the hirer could pick. In this case the company
had men present their credentials and, when satisfied that certain men met
their requirements, they asked them to stand on one side. This was the
acknowledged means of indicating that men had been selected for engagement by the hirer. The High Court14 held that this picking-up process
was merely a preliminary to a contract and that, therefore, there could not
have been a procurement of a breach of contract. But the Supreme Court
of South Australia (Full Court) had heldz5 that the only bar to holding
that a contract had been entered into was that there was a statutory
requirement that articles be signed by every seaman engaged and that
these articles represented the contract of hire. The South Australian Court
felt that, as the signing of the articles was, in fact, a mere formality after
men had been selected following a pick-up, the action of the defendants
was an actionable procurement of a breach of contract. In the light of
these facts, the High Court's decision would seem to underline how
fundamental the prerequisite of the existence of a contract is to the
founding of the tort.
In similar vein, the Victorian Supreme Court decided that a trade union
official was entitled to cause an employer to replace a non-unionist
employee with a union member. The trade union and the employer had a
contract which provided that unionists should be given employment in
preference to non-unionists whenever possible, and the Court accepted
the trade union official's claim that when he caused the plaintiff nonunionist to be replaced by a unionist he was acting lawfully pursuant to
that agreement. Therefore, the question before the Court was simply
whether this otherwise lawful act had become actionable at the behest of
the plaintiff because it had induced a breach of contract. It was held that
it had not because the plaintiff was employed on an hour to hour basis and
the employer had the right not to renew the contract after it expired. The
plaintiff had worked to the end of one day and, when on the next day, a
unionist was made available the plaintiff was simply not reemployed. In
14

Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. Gavan Duffy C.J. and Starke J. dissented
on the basis that the defendants were liable in conspiracy, another allegation of
the plaintas; they did not concern themselves with the question of whether or
not a contract had been formed.
I19301 S.A.S.R. 364.
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coming to this decision Madden C.J. stated that a mere interference with a
reasonable expectation of employment was not sufficient to found a right
of action.16
As a final illustration, consider Doust v. Godhehear.17There, one Bower
had a contract for the conveyance of post office mail. The plaintiff entered
into a contract with Bower to take the running of the said mail over from
him. Bower was at all times in the employ of the defendant. The defendant,
having come to the conclusion that the plaintiff should not reside in the
neighbourhood, told Bower that unless he terminated his contract with
the plaintiff, the defendant would terminate its contract with Bower. Bower
thereupon dismissed the plaintiff who sued the defendant for procuring this
breach of contract. It was held that the plaintiff had not made out a
cause of action because his agreement with Bower was not enforceable as
a contract. The reason for its non-enforceability was that, as the agreement
between the plaintiff was to be performed for a period of more than one
year, it had to be in writing (which it was not) to comply with the Statute
of Frauds requirements.
These cases demonstrate how the judiciary's preoccupation with verbal
formulae rather than with the conceptual underpinning of the law will
sometimes lead it to make decisions which, although according to the
legal logic employed may be regarded as eminently sound, are in contradiction to the aims on which these verbal formulae are postulated. Thus, if
one of the possible rationales for the existence of the tort of inducement
of breach of contract is that, by making inducers of a breach liable, such
conduct will be deterred, thereby preserving the hallowed position of
contract-making in our society, it is hard to see how a finding against the
plaintiffs in the cases discussed will aid that desideratum. If a legal
technicality deprives people of this protection against interference by
strangers, it is not easy to understand how people will feel encouraged to
enter into the negotiations and agreements which are part and parcel of
free contract-making. In as much as people need to be deterred, wilful,
malicious people will not be deterred by an action which cannot be
brought against them if their reprehensible tactics are successful in that
no contract is ever formed.
Similarly, in as much as the existence of the tort is said to be justified
because the remedies that the promisee has against the promisor are
inadequate, Doust v. Godbehear reveals that strict insistence that there
be an enforceable contract which is broken ere liability can be imposed
will deny an additional remedy where it is most needed. In a case such as
that one the promisee will not have an action against the promisor at all.ls
But let us return to the main theme.
16
17
18

Bond V . Morris [I9121 V.L.R. 351, 356.
(1925) 28 W.A.L.R. 59.
Contrast the situation in the U.S.A. where the action against the inducer is permitted in cases like Doust v. Godbehear; see Seitz v. MicheE, 148 Minn. 474, 181
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McKernan v. Fraser, Bond v. Morris and Doust v. Godbehear suggest
that the courts have treated Lumley v. Gye as having created a new kind
of tortious liability, viz. that where the right which a plaintiff claims has
been violated is a contract, liability will be imposed on the violator even
though his conduct would not otherwise be held to be tortious. This
explains the need the courts felt to spell out an enforceable contract in
those cases. If there is in fact such a separate action one would expect that
(i) as the results in those cases suggest, there would never be an action
by a plaintiff against a person like the defendants in those cases
unless the plaintiff could show that the defendant's conduct had
induced a breach of an enforceable contract concluded between the
plaintiff and another; and
(ii) if the plaintiff could show that his contract with another had been
breached as a result of a stranger's conduct, the plaintiff would
automatically have an action in tort against the stranger.
Neither of these expectations are fulfilled by the court's decisions.

( 1 ) No contract, but defendant made liable for his otherwise lawful act
In Ratcliffe v. Evans,lg the plaintiff had, upon his father's death, continued
to run the business of his father as an engineer and a boilermaker under its
established name of "Ratcliffe & Sons". The defendant was a newspaper
publisher who had published a statement to the effect that "Ratcliffe &
Sons" were no longer in business. It was found as a fact that the defendant
knew this statement to be false and had published it because he wished to
damage the plaintiff. The plaintiff praved a general loss of business after
the publication of the statement although he was unable to prove the loss
of any particular customers or orders as a result of the publication. It was
held that, even though the publication did not amount to a defamatory
statement or libel, the plaintiff should succeed and he received damages.
The name given to this cause of action is injurious falsehood.20Comparing
it to the so-called Lumley v. Gye action, some obvious points can be made.
The first of these is that there is no insistence that the plaintiff's right
which has been violated be an enforceable contract. The plaintiff in
Ratclifle v. Evans recovered because his potential contracts were interfered
with. Can this be explained away by the fact that in Ratclifle v. Evans the
defendant's conduct had been reprehensible, whereas it need not be so for
an action in inducement of breach of contract to succeed? The answer
is "NO". Although one might condemn the defendant's conduct in
N.W. 106 (1921); Miles Medical Co. V. I . D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.S.373, 31
Sup. Ct. 376 (1911).

19
20

[I8921 2 Q.B. 524.
This was the label attached by Salmond to various causes of action which had as
their common ingredient the telling by the defendant of a falsehood which
indirectly caused the plaintiff to suffer damage. The prototype of tbis kind of
action was slander on title.
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Ratclifle v. Evans as unworthy of a gentleman, or as having no redeeming
social intent, the fact remains that the defendant's false statement was in
itself lawful. In this respect it is on all fours with the defendant's conduct
which leads to the imposition of liability when it induces a breach of
contract. What supposedly distinguishes that tort from all other causes of
action is that the defendant's conduct need not itself be actionable if it
leads to the breach of an enforceable contract. In the same way, the
falsehood in Ratclifle v. Evans would not have been actionable unless the
damage of which the plaintiff complained had ensued.
Ratclifle v. Evans does not stand alone. Many similar decisions have
been made. Thus, in Casey v. Arnottn the court accepted that the plaintiff
who was the owner of a ship had a good cause of action against the
defendant who by telling people that the ship was unseaworthy had caused
the ship's crew to refuse to go to sea in her. Consequently a negotiation
(not a contract) for the sale of the ship by the plaintiff to another fell
through. Again, when a journalist under the heading "The Poet's Experience" wrote rather graphically about the hearing of rappings, footfalls,
the opening and shutting of doors, and of the noiseless turning of door
handles in a house in which he stayed and then attributed all these
phenomena to a ghost, the newspaper proprietors were sued by the owner
of the house who claimed that his opportunity to rent the house at a good
rental had been diminished. The plaintiff only failed because he could not
prove that the article had so damaged him, many previous articles to the
same effect having been published before.22 In Riding v. Smiths the
plaints claimed that his business as a grocer and draper had fallen off
ever since the defendant had stated in public that the plaintiff's wife, who
assisted in the business, had committed adultery. Although he could not
prove that a particular contract was breached, it was held that a general
diminution in business was sufficient to ground a cause of action, even
though the defendant's statement did not amount to actionable slander.
Kelly C.B. stated:
"It appears to me, as to the first point, that if a man states of another,
who is a trader earning his livelihood by dealing in articles of trade,
anything, be it what it may, the natural consequences of uttering which
would be to injure the trade and prevent persons from resorting to the
21

(1876) 2 C.P.D. 24.

z2 Barrett v. Associated Newspapers (Limited), (1907) 23 T.L.R. 666. See also

"

Manitoba Free Press Co. v. Rachel Miriam Gomez Nagy (1907) 39 S.C.R. 340.
Other cases of iniurious falsehood include Harprave v. Le Breton (1769) 4 Burr.
2422; 98 E.R. 269; Hall-Gibbs Mercantile ~ & n cLimited
~
v. ~ i h b s(1910) 12
C.L.R. 84. In some of the Australian States, the Defamation Code has made
imputations which are likely to injure a person in his profession or trade, or
likely to induce such persons to be shunned, avoided, ridiculed or despised,
defamatory. This means that statements which at common law would amount to
injurious falsehoods are statutorily actionable. See J. G. Fleming, The Law o f
Torts, (4th ed., Sydney: Law Book Co. 1971) p. 422.
(1876) 1 Ex. D. 91.
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place of business, and it so leads to loss of trade, it is actionable. . . .
Supposing the statement made not to be slander, but something else
calculated to injure the shopkeeper in the way of trade, as for instance
a statement that one of his shopmen was suffering from an infectious
disease, such as scarlet fever, this would operate to prevent people
coming to the shop; and whether it be slander or some other statement
which has the effect I have mentioned, an action can, in my opinion, be
maintained on the ground that it is a statement made to the public
which would have the effect of preventing their resorting to the shop
and buying goods of the owner."24
The affinity between these cases and the tort of inducement of breach
of contract is manifest: the act of which the plaintiff complains is, of
itself, not actionable; it only becomes so if the plaintiff can establish that
he suffered damage. But if he can establish that, the lack of an enforceable
contract between him and another is no bar to recovery. The existence of
this general area of recovery, so conveniently labelled "injurious falsehood",
does suggest that the cause of action known as an inducement of breach
of contract is not a newly emerged head of tort liability at all.
Returning to a point made a little earlier, it could be argued that, as
injurious falsehood requires that the defendant's conduct be classed as
malicious,2%e tort is different to the action of inducement of breach of
contract. But it has already been shown that liability will be imposed under
the rubric of injurious falsehood even though the defendant's act was
lawful. Thus to say that the defendant's act must have been done with
malice appears to add little to the description of the tort. Indeed, in some
cases it has been held that malice means without just cause or excuse.26
The sixteenth edition of SalmondZ7states that the malice required is some
dishonest or otherwise improper motive possessed by the defendant. For
this proposition the learned author cites London Ferro-Concrete Co. Ltd.
v. J ~ s t i c z which
, ~ ~ case, in turn, relied upon (amongst other authorities)
the seventh edition of Salmond as authority for that proposition. In any
event, it does not seem important whether malice is d e h e d as conduct
without just cause or excuse or as conduct which is improper or dishonest.
Assume that the latter is the accepted formulation: in what way were the
defendants' motives in the cases discussed improper or dishonest? Did those
defendants' acts do any more than reveal that they intended to harm the
plaintiff and (in some cases) perhaps to gain some advantage for themselves out of causing such harm? And is this not also the motivation which
has spurred on the defendants in the cases examined who were made
Ibid., 93-4.
Royal Baking Powder C o . v. Wright, Crossley & Co. (1901) 18 R.P.C. 95.
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright, Crossley & C o . (1901) 18 R.P.C. 95, Joyce
v. Motor Surveys [I9481 Ch. 252.
27 Salmond on the Law of Torts (16th ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell 1973) by
R. F. V. Heuston, p. 407.
2s (1951) 68 R.P.C. 261.
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liable for inducing a breach of contract? Thus, even though malice is said
to be an essential ingredient of the tort of injurious falsehood, this does
not serve to differentiate that tort from that of inducing a breach of
contract.
Passing-off is another head of tort liability which bears a remarkable
resemblance to the tort of inducing a breach of contract. There will be an
action against a person who pretends that "his goods or services are those
of the plaintiff or associated with him or sponsored by him".29 There are
many variants of the tort, but a typical example is provided by Sparks v.
Harper & CO.~OThe plaintiff and defendants were both coffee merchants.
The plaintiff manufactured a special mixture of coffee and chicory, the
recipe for which was secret. It was marketed in tins which bore the label
"Finest French Coffee, as prepared and used in the principal towns of
France-Cafe Parisien. Sole holder of the receipt in Queensland, B. Sparks,
Brisbane". The tins were coloured red, white and blue. The defendant
subsequently marketed a brand of coffee in tins coloured red, brown, white
and blue which looked just like the plaintiff's tins, and the label on which
prominently included the words "French Coffee". It was held that the
defendants had wished to deceive the public into thinking that their
product was that of the plaintiff, that the public was likely to have been
deceived and the plaintiff would have suffered damage. Accordingly, the
plaintiff was awarded an injunction restraining the defendants from using
the name and format of marketing they had used."
The essence of the tort is that the defendant's conduct would probably
deceive a pertinent sector of the public and that this is likely to cause the
plaintiff some damage because his custom will fall off as a consequence of
29

30
31

J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, op. cit. p. 626. Salmond on the Law o f Torts,
p. 409 sets out the various forms that the tort may assume:
"(1) A direct statement that the merchandise or business of the defendant is
that of the plaintiff.
(2) Trading under a name so closely resembling that of the plaintiff as to be
mistaken for it by the public.
(3) elling goods under a trade name already appropriated for goods of that
lund by the plaintiff, or under any name so similar thereto as to be
mistaken for it.
(4) Selling goods with the trademark of the plaintiff or any deceptive
imitation attached thereto.
(5) Imitating the get-up or appearance of the plaintiff's goods so as to deceive
the public."
(1890) 3 Q.L.J. 201.
Other illustrations of this wide-ranging tort are: Lord Byron v. Johnston (1 8 16),
2 Mer. 29, Routh v. Webster (1847), 10 Beav. 561, 50 E.R. 698. Maxwell v. Hogg
(1867), L.R. 2 Ch. App. 307, Dixon v. Holden (18&9), L.R. 7 Eq. 488; Day v.
Brownrigg (1878), 10 Ch. D. 294; Walter v. Ashton [I9021 2 Ch. 282; McCullock
V. Lewis A. May (Produce Distributors) Ltd. 119471 2 All E.R. 845, Spalding
Bros. v. Gamage Ltd. (1915) 84 L.J. Ch. 449, Sales AFliates v. Le Jean [I9471
1 All E.R. 287, Ramsay v. Nicol [I9391 V.L.R. 330; Totalization Agency Board
v. Turf News [I9671 V.R. 605, Ronson Ltd. v. J. Ronson Ltd. 119571 V.R. 405,
Henderson v. Radio Corporation (1960) 60 S.R. (N.S.W.) 576. See also generally
W. L. Morison, "Unfair Competition and Passing-OfF" (1956) 2 Syd. L. Rev. 50
and J. G. Fleming, The Law o f Torts, op. cit. pp. 626-31.
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this deception. It is not necessary that the defendant's conduct which
caused the deception was the result of a fraud practised by the defendant.32
Thus, once again, conduct is made actionable which would, in the absence
of this head of tort, not be actionable. Once again, the rights violated are
not possessed because of the existence of an enforceable contract, suggesting, once again, that there is no reason to believe that there is a separate
tort designed to protect contractual relationships. It might be argued that
as in the passing-off area the defendant's conduct must be likely to deceive,
it is of such a reprehensible nature that liability ought to be imposed even
though no contract was breached and that, therefore, one can still say that
contractual relationships are given protection by tort when other relationships are not. But, as in injurious falsehood, the reprehensible behaviour of
the defeodant is not independently unlawful. It has already been seen that
where the defendant's conduct is such that it amounts to an injurious falsehood, there will be actionability whether the interest interfered with was a
contract or not.33Now, it transpires that, where there is conduct likely to
deceive and damage ensues, there will be liability imposed for that conduct
whether the interest interfered with was a contract or not. Hence the
potential kinds of acts and modes of conduct against which contracts are
protected and other interests are not, include one less group, viz. acts and
conduct calculated to deceive. The three cases used in the previous section,
McKernan v. Fraser, Bond v. Morris and Doust v. Godbehear are illustrations of the fact that in some situations liability will be imposed for
conduct which, in the absence of an enforceable contract which was
breached as a result of such conduct, would be legally excusable. But the
discussion of the area of injurious falsehood and passing-off suggests that
such cases might well be explicable on other grounds than that a special
area of tort liability has been developed to protect the status of contract
and contractual relations. If indeed, it is true that there is nothing conclusive
about the existence of a contract or lack thereof, one would expect to
find that the converse is true, viz. that conduct which induces breaches
of contract will not necessarily be actionable.
(ii) Contract breached as a consequence o f the defendant's conduct, but
defendant not liable
Liability will not be imposed on a person whose conduct induced a breach
of contract between two other people unless it was the intention of the
actor that there should be such a breach of contract. This does not mean,
as has been noted, that the actor need to have borne the plaintiff spite or
32
33

Spalding Bros. v. Gamage Ltd. (1915) 84 L.J. Ch. 449.
Note the case of Petree v. Knox (1917) 17 S.R. (N.S.W.) 505, where it was held
that a fraudulent misrevresentation which led an employer to lawfully dismiss its
employee, gave the employee a right of action againsi the misrepresentor if he
could prove damages. That is, just as the lack of an enforceable contract does not
bar an action for a false statement leading to economic loss, the existence of an
enforceable contract, which is not breached, does not erect such a bar,
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ill-will, but rather that it is required that, in engaging in the conduct
which induced the breach of conduct, the actor desired this consequence
to eventuate. Hence, if the most that the plaintiff can show is that he lost
the benefit of an enforceable contract because of negligent conduct by the
defendant, there will usually be no actionability. Thus, in La Socie'te' Anon y m de Remorquage 6 He'lice v. Bennett~?~
the plaintiffs were the owners
of a steam tug, which, under contract, was towing a ship when a steamship,
operated by the defendant, as a result of the operators' negligence, collided
with and sank the towed ship. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for the
amount of money lost because the towing contract could not be performed.
They failed. This decision was, of course, consistent with the principle
that, in order to recover economic loss caused by the negligence of
another, a special relationship had to exist between the plaintiff and the
defendant, or the economic loss had to be associated closely with a physical
property loss.35 Any expansion on this principle, so it was and still is
thought, would lead to recovery for losses which spread far and wide
throughout the community, imposing an unwo~itedburden on individuals,
and inhibiting desirable enterprises and activities. But where the economic
loss arising out of the breach of contract is intentionally inflicted, liability
will often be imposed because such intentional conduct is to be discouraged. For instance, if in La Socikte' Anonyme v. Bennetts the
defendant had deliberately rammed the towed ship in order to stop
the plaintiffs from completing their contract there can be no doubt
that the plaintiffs would have r e c ~ v e r e d .So
~ ~ far the nature of the
conduct of the inducer of the breach of the contract has been treated
as being of little importance in the sense that it has been assumed that if it
brought about the breach of contract, liability could be imposed regardless
of its nature. But from the foregoing it is plain that the law, by insisting
that it must have been the intent of the actor to induce the breach of
contract, demonstrates that it is concerned with more than whether or not
a contract was breached; how the breach was engineered is of significance,
denoting that a judgment is exercised between competing interests, namely
protection of the contract and freedom of action by the inducer of a breach
of contract.37The remainder of this section is concerned with showing how
the courts have been engaged in making this kind of policy choice.
34
35

[I9111 1 K.B. 243.
Cattle V. Stockton Waterworks Co., (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 453; Hedley Byrne &
Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. 119641 A.C. 465, M.L.C. v. Evatt, 119711 A.C.
793, Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., 119721 3
All E.R. 557, S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittall & Son Ltd. 119711
1 O.B. 337.
D.-C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, [I9521 Ch. 646, 695, 702.
Where there is a special relationship between an adviser and the plaintiff, the
adviser will be liable for the economic loss that the plaintiff will suffer as a result
of relying on that advice if it was carelessly given. Careless conduct will therefore
have the same effect as intentional conduct where a relationship "equivalent to
contract" exists. That is, here too, the law acknowledges that the nature of the
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If the imposition of liability requires an intention on behalf of the actor
to induce the breach, it follows that the actor must have known that there
was a contract between the plaintiff and another. Indeed, LauterpachP8
argues that the requirement of intent means no more than that the
defendant should have had knowledge that his conduct would lead to a
breach of contract between the plaintiff and another. The earlier cases of
inducement of breach of contract put no onus on the actor to make
inquiries as to whether or not there were contractual relations with which
his conduct might interfere. In British Industrial Plastics Ltd. v. F e r g u ~ o n ~ ~
the plaintiffs had employed D for many years. When D left their employ
he agreed, by an enforceable contract, not to enter into a business
concerned with the manufacture and sale of chemicals used in a secret
process the plaintiffs used. Thereafter D approached the defendant and
told him that he had knowledge of a process that might be of use to him
and his company. The defendant was interested but did not want to
interfere with anyone else's rights, so he sent D to his company's patent
agents, in the belief that if D's idea was patentable his company could
then apply for a patent and that ii this was obtained there could be no
question of unlawfully interfering with a trade secret. The patent agent
duly informed their clients that the process proposed by D was patentable.
An application was made by the defendant's company for a patent; the
plaintiffs sued him and his company for inducing a breach of the contract
between them and D. The Court of Appeal held that, although the
defendant's belief that there could be no violation of a trade secret if D's
process was patentable was stupid, it had been honestly held, and the
defendant (or his company) could not be fixed with constructive knowledge
of the existence of the contract he had allegedly induced. Having no
knowledge, actual or constructive, the defendants could not be made liable.
Recent decisions, however, have imposed liability after imputing
knowledge of the terms of an existing contract to the defendants. The
outstanding pronouncement along these lines is to be found in Lord
Denning's judgment in Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lo~thian:~O
conduct is more reprehensible in some circumstances than in others, although the
damage inflicted by the conduct is identical no matter what the circumstances. For
instance, although there is much debate about what a special relationship is,
the overruling of the decision in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [I9511 2
K.B. 164 in Hedley Byrne v. Heller, ibid., means that, where accounts are prepared
specifically for a prospective investor, even in the absence of an intentionally false
statement, or in the absence of an intent to cause loss, the preparer of the accounts
will be liable to the prospective investor if the preparation was careless and the
prospective investor invested and lost. But if the accounts were not prepared for a
specific person, that is, in the absence of a special relationship or fraud (which is
becoming less restrictively defined) and the same investor lost his money for the
same reason, there may be no recovery. That social policy considerations-such
as limiting the area of recovery-give rise to this distinction is clear.
38

39
40

Op. cit.
[I9401 1 All E.R. 479.
[I9661 1 All E.R. 1013, 1017.
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"The parties . . . had a right to have their contractual relations preserved
inviolate without unlawful interference by others; . . . If the officers
of the trade union knowing of the contract deliberately sought to procure
breach of it, they would do wrong; see Lumley v. Gye. Even if they did
not know of the actual terms of the contract, but had the means of
knowledge-which they deliberately disregarded-that would be enough.
Like the man who turns a blind eye. So here, if the officers deliberately
sought to get this contract terminated, heedless of its terms, regardless
whether it was terminated by breach or not, they would do wrong. For
it is unlawful for a third person to procure a breach of contract
knowingly, or recklessly, indifferent whether it is a breach or not."
This attitude widens the ambit of protection for contractual relationships.
In J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley41 it was held that, as the defendants
knew that barges were always returned promptljr on the completion of the
job for which they were hired, "it must have been obvious to them that
this was done under contracts between the appellants and the large
hirers".42 The requirement of intent for the application of the principle of
Lumley v. Gye was therefore held to be satisfied. In that case the defendants were unionists and it can readily be seen how this extension of
liability-by imputing knowledge to a defendant and thus satisfying the
intent requirement--could be disastrous for trade unions. Every time that
a trade union causes its members to strike it is likely that there will be an
interference with the performance of contracts by the struck employer.
That, like the defendants in Stratford v. Lindley, they must know of the
existence of such contracts although not of their precise terms, is selfevident. And if one need not know of the exact terms of the contract,
liability should be imposed on the trade union (and its striking members)
if a promisee of the struck employer sues it (and them) for inducing a
breach of contract.* The potential danger this presents to trade unions is
well-illustrated by a fact situation suggested by the case of Director of
. ~ ~ a lawyer had applied to have a
Posts and Telegraphs v. A b b ~ t t There
telephone installed in new offices he was to occupy on a certain date. He
had advised the Posts and Telegraphs offices of the special need he had
41

42
43

*4

[I9651 A.C. 269.
Per Lord Reid, at 323.
Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins 119691 1 All E.R. 522 is a dramatic illustration
of how the English courts have come to impute knowledge to defendants ~n
inducing breach of contract cases, whether or not the defendants have any actual
knowledge of the provisions of the contract. There a unlon hav~ngsome Idea that
there was a contract between the plaintiffs and an oil company under which the
oil company would supply fuel to the plaintiffs, took action to stop such supp!y.
It was held that the unionists were liable for interfering with the contract desplte
the fact that there was no breach of contract. There was no breach because the
contract, unbeknown to the unionists, had a force majeure clause which relieved
the oil company from the obligation of supplying fuel if a labour dispute should
make it impossible to do so. The mere fact that the defendants intended that a
breach of contract be induced was sufficient to found liability, even though the
defendants had no way of knowing whether their conduct would cause a breach.
[I9741 2 A.L.R. 62.5.
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to have the telephone available from the very first day of his occupation
of his new offices, telling them that, if they could not guarantee installation
by the date scheduled for the opening of his new offices, he would delay
the date of such opening to a day on which they could guarantee installation. The Posts and Telegraphs people assured the lawyer that he would
have his telephone on the required date. In fact they failed to install the
telephone on that day because of a strike called by their employees. These
employees had no particular knowledge of the lawyer's dealings with their
employer, nor of their employer's acquiescence to his request. The
Supreme Court of South Australia held that there had been no binding
contract between the Posts and Telegraphs offices and the lawyer; but let
us assume that there had been such an enforceable contract: could the
strikers be made liable to the lawyer for inducing a breach of that contract?
If the doctrine of "turning a blind eye" were taken to its logical conclusion,
liability ought to follow. Such a result would seriously inhibit trade union
activity and, unsurprisingly, the courts have indicated that they will
attempt to lessen the impact which would result from taking the doctrine
to its logical conclusion. In Torquay v. Cousins Lord Denning M.R.
clearly saw the perils for trade unionism if he mathematically were to apply
the "turning a blind eye" principle: 45
"A trade union official, who calls a strike on proper notice, may well
know that it will prevent the employers from performing their contracts
to deliver goods, but he is not liable in damages for calling it. Indirect
interference is only unlawful if unlawful means are used. . . . This
distinction [between direct and indirect interferences] must be maintained, else we should take away the right to strike altogether. Nearly
every trade union official who calls a strike . . . knows that it may
prevent the employers from performing their contracts. He may be
taken even to intend it. Yet no one has supposed hitherto that it was
unlawful; and we should not render it unlawful today."
Here we have a straight-forward expression by Lord Denning that even
though the defendant intended to induce a breach of a contract the
existence and general terms of which he will be assumed to have known,
he will not be liable if his conduct did not directly induce such a breach
and was not otherwise unlawful. Although the intended result of the
defendant's conduct is the same as in Lumley v. Gye itself there is to be
no liability. As the violated contract in the excepted situation is just as
valid and just as socially valuable (presumably) as the one in Lumley v.
Gye, the distinction between the cases lies in the merit of the defendant's
conduct. The social policy consideration offered by Lord Denning in the
45

[I9691 1 All E.R. 522, 530. The reference to calling a strike on proper notice is
a reference to the situation which arose in Morgan v. Fry 119681 2 Q.B. 710,
where such notice having been given, it was held that the ensuing strike was not
unlawful. This point will be adverted to below.
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passage quoted is clear proof that the courts mill not automatically make
a defendant liable because he intentionally, that is, with actual or imputed
knowledge of the contract and the effect of his conduct on it, procures a
breach of a contract. To clinch the argument, note that the qualification or
liability for indirectly inducing a breach of contract was not just a reaction
necessitated by the unwarranted increase in the ambit of the tort by the
decision in Emerald Constructions v. Lowthian. Long before the holding
there that knowledge of a contract and its terms could be imputed to the
defendant, it had been authoritatively held that indirectly inducing a breach
of contract was not actionable unless the defendant's conduct was
independently unlawful; at that time it was also held that the defendant
must also have had actual knowledge of the contract whose breach he
induced.46The effect of removing both these limitations-which arose out
of policy considerations-gave rise to the fear Lord Denning expressed.
There are other situations where there is both an intent to induce a
breach of contract and an ensuing breach of contract where no liability is
imposed on the person who induced the breach. Thus, the defendant will
be held not liable if he merely induced a breach of contract because the
promisor could not perform his part of the bargain without breaching a
prior contract that he had made with the defendant.47 If the rationale
underlying inducing a breach of contract as a cause of action in tort is the
protection of private contract-making, it is easy to see why the defendant's
conduct is not actionable in cases like this. Note that the second innocent
promisee will have an action for breach of contract against the common
promisor, because the second contract was, by definition, an enforceable
contract. If the enforceability of the first contract is deemed to be worthy
of protection to the extent that the promisee to that contract may defend
it by conduct which in another would be tortious, it ought to follow that it
would be sufficiently worthy of protection where the second promisee knew
of the prior contract and its inconsistence with his own, yet still sought
to have the second contract performed. But what will be the situation
where the second promisee enters into the second contract without
knowledge of the first and, having acquired such knowledge, continues to
perform the second contract? In Thomson v. Deakin Jenkins L.J. thought
such a person would have committed an actionable interferen~e.~~
But a
recent Victorian case shows, once again, that the principle of protecting
validly made contracts against intentional interference is by no means
immutable.
In H. C. Sleigh Ltd. v.
the plaintiff was an oil company who
had made an agreement with the Blights, proprietors of a service station,
46

47
48

*

Thomson v. Deakin [I9521 Ch. 646.
Smithies v. National Associafion o f Operative Plasterers [I9091 1 K.B. 310, 337.
119521 Ch. 646, 694.
[I9691 V.R. 931,
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under which the plaintiff was to supply the Blights with fuel products.
The Blights agreed to buy their total requirements in fuel products from
the plaintiff and not to sell anyone else's products during the term of the
agreement. They further agreed not to assign their interest in the service
station during the continuance of the agreement to any but an assignee
approved of by the plaintiff. In breach of this agreement the Blights
entered into a contract for sale of their business to the Bishops. It was a
sixty-day contract. Prior to the execution of the contract, the would-be
purchasers obtained from the Blights a written statement to the effect that
the Blights had at no time entered into an agreement with an oil company.
The contract was then signed and a deposit paid. Before the balance of the
purchase money was to be paid, the plaintiff oil company heard of the
purported sale and informed the Bishops of the existence of the plaintiff's
agreement with the Blights. The Bishops nonetheless completed the contract. Amongst other actions, an action was brought against them by the
plaintiff oil company for wrongful interference with the plaintiff's contractual rights. Adam J. held that the plaintiff should fail. He could see
no reason why the defendant should give up the benefit of his innocently
obtained contract, even thought that contract was voidable at the behest
of the defendant when he was informed of the Blights agreement with
the plaintiff; that is, because of the misrepresentation made to them, the
Bishops could at that time have refused to complete and have their deposit
reimbursed. This is yet another case, then, in which a breach of contract
was intentionally induced by the defendant but in which the defendant was
not made liable.
Sometimes the very nature of the contract breached will prevent the
inducer of the breach from being made responsible for the breach. The
standard illustration is breach of a contract of promise to marry. Where
a father induces his impressionable daughter to break such a contract, it
has been suggested that the father will not be liable in tort to the disappointed promisee because "the father's justification arises from a moral
duty to urge [his daughter] that the contract should be rep~diated".~~
The
policy consideration which prevents a defendant of this kind from being
sued in tort is manifest. Note that Viscount Simon envisaged a situation in
which the disappointed promisee is a "scoundrel". Presumably the defence
of justification would be available whether or not the promisee was in fact
a scoundrel (or even if the advice was given to a son rather than a
daughter), as long as the adviser had an honest belief that he had good
reason to advise his child to break a contract of a promise to marry.
In any event, it is clear that the merit of the defendant's conduct is
to be taken into account for this kind of conduct to be rendered nonactionable. This is a marked departure from the stated judicial position
50

Crofter Handwoven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch [I9421 A.C. 435; per Viscount
Simon L.C. at 443.
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in respect of the contractual relationships so far examined. It may well be
that the defence of justification should also be available where relationships
analogous to those of parent-child are involved; for instance, where a
medical practioner advises a patient who has entered into a contract that
he should not perform the contract and thereby induces a breach, or a
solicitor who advises his client to break an existing contract and pay the
damages rather than go on with an unfortunately struck bargain. If courts
are permitted to look at the moral worth of the defendant's conduct, the
medical and legal advisers in these examples ought to be free to induce
breaches of contracts when they act in good faith. But the reluctance of
the courts to indulge in this kind of value judgment-making is manifested
by the fact that there are very few cases in which they have actually held
that the defendant's conduct, even though plainly engaged in with the most
worthy of motives, was not actionable by a promisee to the contract which
had been breached as a result of the defendant's conduct.
Thus, in Camden Nominees, Limited v. F o r ~ e y , ~the
l chairman and
secretary of a tenants' association were held liable for inducing breaches
of contract between tenants and the landlord. The association had been
specifically formed with the object of forcing the landlord to abide by his
obligations under the tenancy agreements, in particular the cleaning of
passages and stairways and the provision of heating. When the landlord
refused to co-operate, the chairman and secretary of the association
counselled other tenants not to pay their rent. The motive of the association
might well be considered laudable, nonetheless the defendants were held
liable. South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal C O .is~probably
~
the low watermark for the availability of justification as a defence. There
the miner's union had called planned "stop-days" during the year. These
were in breach of the miners' contracts of employment. The union had
called the "stop-days" because it feared that the activities of merchants
and middlemen would bring down the price of coal and, therefore, its
members' wage rates. There was no animosity towards the employers, or
a dispute with them. Indeed, the union believed that it was also acting in
the best interests of the colliery-owning employers. The House of Lords
accepted that the unionists acted without any spite or ill-will, and truly
to protect the interests of their members and, to a lesser extent, of the
employers. Nonetheless, the advice which led to the breaches of contract
was held to be an actionable indu~ement.~
Brimelow v. C a ~ s o is
n ~d ~rare instance of a case in which the motive of
51
52
53
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[I9401 Ch. 352.
[I9051 A.C. 239.
This result is probably based on the same notion which caused Porter J. to say
that "the justification must, I think, involve an action taken as a duty, not the
mere protection of the defendants' own interests" in De Ierley Marks v. Greenwood (Lord) [I9361 1 All E.R. 863, 873.
119241 1 Ch. 302.
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the defendant was recognized as justifying his conduct which induced a
breach of contract. There the plaintiff was a theatre manager who paid
his chorus girls less than the minimum wage an actors' union had prescribed. A committee representing theatrical employees wished to stop this
behaviour and induced theatre owners who had entered into contracts
with the plaintiff to have the plaintiff's company perform at their theatre
to break such contracts and induced others who might enter into such
contracts with him not to do so. It was held that this committee could
not be made liable to the plaintiff. The Court was moved to this holding
by the fact that at least one chorus girl of only eighteen years of age had
been forced, because of her poor wages, to live "in immorality" with
another member of the company. The impact of this on the Court was
not lessened by the fact that the man she lived with "in immorality" was
"a tiny, deformed creature, a dwarf" who "was an abnormal man".55
Apart from this case, there are no other instances where the courts have
held that the conduct of the defendant was so morally worthwhile that
the breach of contract it induced did not make the defendant liable.
One other kind of situation in which the defendant's acts lead to a
breach of contract, yet does not make him liable, is noteworthy. James v.
The Cornmon~ealth~~
presented the circumstances very well. There it was
alleged by the plaintiff that common carriers, who had a common law duty
to carry his goods, had refused to do so because they were afraid that a
Commonwealth Department might seize the goods and, as the officers of
that Department had intimated to the carriers, that they would be prosecuted
under the existing law. Such provisions of law did exist at the time of
these intimations, but when challenged, they were held to have been part
of unconstitutionally enacted law, and, therefore, invalid.57The High Court
held, in the words of Dixon J.:
"An intention to put the law in motion cannot be considered a wrongful
procurement or inducement, simply because it turns out that the legal
position maintained was ill-founded."58
His Honour did point out that the Commonwealth officers' belief in the
validity of the law they were invoking must have been bona fide.
It is clear that this case is yet another illustration of the judiciary's
desire to protect some modes of behaviour at the expense of the hallowed
private contract. After all, the tort of inducing a breach of contract is
supposedly made out if the intentional act of the defendant led to the
breach of contract of which the plaintiff complains.* The words chosen by
55
56
57
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Dixon J. in the passage quoted are, if that is the true position, misleading
in that they hint (although His Honour probably did not intend them to)
that there must be something "wrongful" about the defendant's act. That,
it has been noted, is only necessary where there is an indirect inducement
of a breach of contract. The nature of the defendant's conduct does not
matter where the inducement is directly effective; all that is needed is the
causing of the breach with knowledge of the contract. But, if the nature of
the defendant's conduct is to be weighed against the interests of the
plaintiff in some cases, (as seems to have been the case in James v. The
Commonwealth and other cases discussed in this section) it can be posited
that, even though there are very few decisions to support this tenet, the
courts have never truly accepted the view that the limitations which
restrict the area of recovery when rights other than contracts are infringed
do not also apply to cases of inducement of breach of contract. All that
can be said is that where the interest interfered with is an enforceable
contract it is much easier to establish that a tort has been committed than
if there was no such contract.
111
Lumley v. Gye was eventually seen as creating a new area of torts liability
because the decision itself was seen as an enlargement of a peculiarly
narrow head of tort liability, namely, liability for causing a breach of a
contract of service. And the development of this tort was, in turn,
regarded as being based on a false premise. Thus Sayrem describes how in
the &st place a master had an action if his servant was interfered with
because this was meddling with the property of the master and, therefore,
a personal offence was committed against the master; but, the narrative
goes on, the master was given an action only if he lost the services of
his servant as a result of violence being used against the servant. The next
major development that Sayre notices is the passing of the Ordinance of
Labourers in 1349. Its purpose was to ensure the availability of labour
which had become a rare commodity after the Great Plague. The statute
made it an offence to entice servants away from another's employ. This
was an enlargement of the existing common law remedy for the loss of a
servant's services due to a violent attack upon him. The two remedies
"were swept into the capacious maw of the action on the casewa and by
the time Lumley v. Gye came to be decided, it was an actionable wrong
to entice away a servant from his employ. Lumley v. Gye was a major
new departure because Miss Wagner was not engaged under a contract
of service by the plaintiff." This was regarded as a dramatic breakthrough, one which could well lead to liability in circumstances where
61
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the common law had never imposed it. As late as 1896 Rigby L.J. thought
that Lumley v. Gye should not be read as giving a right to sue to every
promisee to a contract whose breach had been induced by a third party:
"[Ilt is not, as I understand the law, every procuring of a breach of
contract that will give a right of action. The nature of the contract
broken must be ~onsidered."~~
Other courts, however, did not see anything remarkable or objectionable in this "development" of the law. As we have seen,64Lord MacNaghten
in Quinn v. Leathem thought that the gist of the action in Lumley v. Gye
was the accepted principle that to knowingly cause a violation of another's
right was an actionable wrong and that a contract was such a right which
could not be violated. Prior to that, in Bowen v. Ha11,6Vt was held that
the action in Lumley v. Gye was merely a particular application of the
principle laid down in Ashby v. White.66That principle was that, whenever
a person did an act which in law and in fact was a wrongful one and
which had as its natural consequence the infliction of injury on another,
the act would result in the imposition of liability. In Lumley v. Gye the
act of the defendant had been wrongful (and therefore attracted liability)
because it had been malicious, although not against the law. In Temperton
v. Ru~sell,6~
the Court of Appeal thought not only that contractual interests
would be protected by giving a cause of action against a third party who
interfered with them, but also that to maliciously induce people not to enter
into contractual relationships with the plaintiff should be actionable.
Then came Allen v. Flood.68There it was held by the House of Lords
that to do an act which was lawful and which caused another person to
be injured did not render the actor liable to the injured person, even if
the act which inflicted the injury was done with malice. To be actionable
the conduct must have been unlawful and the injury must have been one
to a recognized right. In relation to the area of actionability under discussion these general principles were held to have the following applications:
(i) An act which induced another to break a contract was actionable;
it followed that such an act was regarded as unlawful regardless of
the motivation of the actor; and
(ii) whereas an induced breach of contract was the kind of injury for
which redress could be had in torts, inducing persons not to enter
into contracts with the plaintiff was not.
The result was that the ambit of actionability was both enlarged and
restricted. It meant that, once and for all, it had been established that
Exchange Telegraph Company Limited V. Gregory & Co. [I8961 1 Q.B. 147, 157.
Supra fn. 7.
65 (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333.
66 (1703) 1 E.R. 417.
67 [I8931 1 Q.B. 715.
88 [I8981 A.C. 1.
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direct inducement of a breach of contract was actionable without more.
No questions of the nature of the inducement or of the contract broken
were to be of importance. At the same time, the House of Lords drew a
distinction between breach of contract and other related violations of
interests. Both Bowen v. Hall, which emphasized the element of malice,
and Temperton v. Russell, which equated inducing breaches of contract
with inducements not to enter into contract were, therefore, held to be
wrong. That is, the notion that Lumley v. Gye was but one aspect of
general liability principles was denied. It was inevitable, therefore, that
courts, after Allen v. Flood, would view the decision in Lumley v. Gye,
the result in which had not been called into doubt by the House of Lords,
as a case which established that an inducement of a breach of contract
was an actionable tort in its own right to which the qualifications and
limitations pertinent to related areas did not apply.
Yet the holding in Allen v. Flood does not deserve the respect that it
has sometimes been accorded. After all, at trial level, the judge found for
the plaintiffs who had been dismissed-without breach of contract-as a
result of the malicious conduct of the defendant, which had been intended
to have the plaintiffs dismissed and to prevent them being re-engaged. The
three Court of Appeal judges found the defendant liable for violating
both these interests. In the House of Lords, six of the nine judges found
for the defendant on the basis set out above. Of eight other judges who
had heard the argument in the House of Lords after being summoned
to attend, only two wrote opinions in favour of the defendant. Thus, of
the twenty-one judges who wrote opinions, thirteen found for the plaintiffs
and only eight for the defendant.69
At the very least, it is warrantable to pose the question whether the
judicial pronouncements of the majority of the House of Lords in Allen
v. Flood should have been treated as if they were precise commandments
in the nature of unambiguous legislative provisions. That they have been
accorded this treatment is possibly due to the elaborate judicial consideration that was given to the case which, consequently, gave the majority
opinion more status than it might otherwise have received. The headcounting exercise engaged in above suggests that this is not a good reason.
Another reason might be the emphatic language used by members of the
majority. In this light, note one of the most frequently quoted passages of
this much-quoted decision. Lord Herschell had noted that in Temperton v.
69
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M.R., Lopes and Rigby L.JJ.; [I8951 2 Q.B. 21. The House of Lords judges who
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Russell it was thought that, if inducing a breach of contract was actionable, then an inducement not to enter into a contract should be actionable.
His Lordship then stated:
"It seems to have been regarded as only a small step from the one
decision to the other, and it was said that there seemed to be no good
reason why, if an action lay for maliciously inducing a breach of
contract, it should not equally lie for maliciously inducing a person not to
enter into a contract. So far from thinking it a small step from the one
decision to the other, I think there is a chasm between them. The reason
for a distinction between [them] appears to me to be this: that in the
one case the act procured was the violation of a legal right, for which
the person doing the act which injured the plaintiff could be sued as well
as the person who procured it, whilst in the other case no legal right was
violated by the person who did the act from which the plaintiff suffered:
he would not be liable to be sued in respect of the act done, whilst the
person who induced him to do the act would be liable to an action."70
It is pertinent to ask whether the law had always recognized the chasm
whose existence Lord Herschell found so self-evident.
It has already been seen that the old action of slander or disparagement
on title has spawned causes of action in injurious falsehood which give
recovery for violation of interests other than enforceable contractual ones,
even though the injury-inflicting acts are not, in the absence of the injury,
unlawful. This suggests that these causes of action are of the same genus
as the action which, in Allen v. Flood, was thought to be peculiarly
associated with direct interference with contractual relationships. This
genus could be that a wrongful interference which resulted in injury was
always actionable, and that "wrongful" for these purposes did not require
independent unlawfulness but had to have, at the least, a quality which
was referred to as "malicen. Lord Halsbury L.C. in Allen v. Flood, after
an exhaustive review of the cases formed the opinion (that twelve other
judges may be assumed to have shared) that
"in denying these plaintiffs a remedy we are departing from the
principles which have hitherto guided our Courts in the preservation of
individual liberty to all. I am encouraged, however, by the consideration
that the adverse views appear to me to overrule the views of most
distinguished judges, going back now for certainly 200 years, and that
up to the period when this case reached your Lordships' House there
was a unanimous consensus of ~ p i n i o n . " ~
70
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Keeble v. Hi~keringill~~
was most heavily relied upon by Lord Halsbury.
There the plaintiff who kept decoy ducks in his pond in order to trap
ducks for profit was permitted to recover damages against a neighbour
who had allegedly frightened away his prey by letting off a shotgun.
Holt C.J. held that "when a violent or malicious act is done to a man's
occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood; there an action lies
in all cases".73 The case law relied on by Holt C.J. for this principle
(which did not differentiate between existing contractual relationships and
potential contractual relationships, between interference with such relations
and actual breaches of contract, and which did not state that malicious
acts had to be breaches of the law in some independent way) included the
Gloucester schoolmasters' case.74 Holt C.J. suggested that if a rival of an
existing school kept prospective students away from that school by
frightening them by shooting, the existing school's owners would have an
action against the rival. Such a fact situation did arise in Tarleton v.
M ' G a ~ l e yand
~ ~ recovery was allowed, as Holt C.J. had predicted. And
note that the High Court of Australia, after a careful review of the history
of the cases, some two hundred and sixty years ;i£ter Holt's C.J. pronouncement said:
"[Ilt appears that the authorities cited do justify a proposition that,
independently of trespass, negligence or nuisance but by an action for
damages upon the case, a person who suffers harm or loss as the
inevitable consequences of the unlawful, intentional and positive acts of
another is entitled to recover damages from that other."76
This decision has been widely discussed and criticized. The major
criticism has been that, the way the High Court framed its proposition, the
decision meant that whether or not a defendant intended to injure the
plaintiff, the plaintiff would recover and that this was akin to creating a
strict liability principle of actionability for too wide a range of injuries.77
But if one reads "intention" as meaning "done with knowledge", in the
Emerald Construction v. Lowthian sense, it is perhaps, not too large a leap
to go on and say that intention as used by the High Court is in reality a
modern version of malice as used by Holt C.J. in Keeble v. Hickeringill;
when that is done, the principle enunciated by the High Court in 1966 is
the same as the one propounded in the 1706 case. The point will not be
taken further here; it suffices to note that the High Court's review of the
cases did lead it to the conclusion that the action upon the case was, at one
72
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point of time, large enough to encompass injuries suffered wherever
"intentional" interference with an enforceable contract or another recognized
(but not necessarily enforceable) interest occurred. With that in mind, let
us return to the case of Lumley v. Gye.
Two cases relied on by the majority in Lumley v. Gye are of some
interest. The first is Green v. Button.78 There the defendant claimed that
he had a lien on goods that the plaintiff had contracted to receive from a
third person. As a result of this claim, which had been "maliciously and
wrongfully" made, the third person broke his contract with the plaintiff
and did not deliver the goods. The plaintiff was held to have a good cause
of action against the defendant. This case could be classed as a slander
or disparagement on title type case and if the point made is that those cases
form a very special category of liability rather than being manifestations of
a general cause of action such as action on the case, Green v. Button does
not advance the advocated argument much. But note that the majority
in Lumley v. Gye which, after all, held that to maliciously procure a breach
of contract was an actionable wrong, relied upon this case as authority for
that widely stated principle. The second case is Winsmore v. G r e e n b ~ n k . ~ ~
There the plaintiff complained that his wife had left him and that this was
unlawful; further, that the defendant had enticed her to so stay away from
her husband and had harboured her secretly; and that, as a result, the
plaintiff had lost the benefit and advantage of a large estate that the wife
had inherited while she was away from her husband. Willis C.J. agreed
that the loss of the comfort and assistance of his wife was the result of
the wife's unlawful act but went on to hold that this would not mean that
the plaintiff could maintain an action against the defendant unless the
defendant's action could also be classified as unlawful. He then went on to
say that if "the defendant persuaded the plaintiff's wife to do an unlawful
act, it was unlawful in the defendant".80 This was relied on in Lumley v.
Gye where the unlawful act of the wife in Winsmore v. Greenbank was
equated with Miss Wagner's breach of contract. There was no thought that
liability should be restricted to cases where the conduct of the defendant
was independently unlawful or that there was a restricted number of
interests which would be protected against interference by a stranger. For
instance, Wightman J. a member of the majority in Lumley v. Gye, opined
that "upon the authority of the two cases referred to, of Green v. Button
and Winsmore v. Greeenbank, as well as upon general principles, that an
action on the case is maintainable".81
Thus, despite the conclusions to which the views expressed by the
majority in Allen v. Flood pointed, there are more than s a c i e n t strands
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of authority to suggest that inducing a breach of contract was but a species
of a general cause of action. It is suggested that the gist of this cause of
action was that unlawful conduct leading to injury was to be actionable,
as well as lawful conduct which interfered with a certain number of
interests. That is, it was one whose essence was a balancing of interest
against interest and/or interest against conduct. The question that has to
be put is whether a reasonable formulation of this balancing test can be
devised for the judiciary's use in modern times and, if this can be done,
whether it would be advisable to have the courts openly apply such a
balancing test.

The guidelines to be provided hereunder are framed on the basis that our
society wishes the law to uphold the free enterprise creed in as much as it
does not conflict with other known social objectives. The thesis of this
section is that, in effect, the courts have already employed this underlying
philosophy, but that because they have not done so openly or consciously,
they have created anomalies in the state of the law and have caused
lawyers to lose faith in the system of technical precedent as well as caused
certain sections of the community to be cynical about the law's ability to
achieve justice.
The starting point for the suggested guidelines is that interference with
commercial relationships will be actionable if license to interfere with
them would detract from the ability of free enterprise to flourish. The
question of liability can, therefore, not be determined by drawing artificial
distinctions between the interests violated on the basis that these interests
are or are not enforceable as contracts. Free enterprise is promoted by
giving as many people as possible as much opportunity as possible of
entering into business relationships with one another. Thus an interference
with such an opportunity might well give rise to a cause of action.
On the other hand, free enterprise is not just seen as a means to
maximize productivity and efficiency. At its core is the notion that, by
holding out the carrot to each individual that if he uses his initiative he will
be rewarded, the development and freedom of the individual will be
enhanced. This means that the right to engage in commerce with whomever
one likes about whatever one chooses has, according to this theory, as its
corollary, the right not to engage in commerce with particular people or
about particular subjects of commerce. Inevitably, then, there will be
conflicts arising when one group of people claim that they have a right to
engage in certain conduct and others claim that they have a right not to
be forced to engage in that conduct with the first claimants, or that they
have an equal right to that of the claimants in obtaining rewards for such
conduct and should, therefore, be permitted to prevent the claimants from
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engaging in the said conduct. In the face of such disputes, the aim of
promoting free enterprise makes it permissible and logical for the courts to
make their decision between the rival claims on the basis of whether or not
one claimant already had a right recognized by the law as an enforceable
right. Thus, if A, an employee of B, induces B to dismiss C in breach of
C's contract of employment with B, because A wishes to exercise his "free
enterprise" right not to work with C, it is reasonable for a court to say
that C has an action against A because his contractual right was violated
as a result of A's conduct. Now A has done no more than give effect to
his free choice, and it has been seen that the exercise of free choice is
justifiable when free enterprise is the ideal that is sought to be promoted.
But C also pursued his free choice when he entered into employment with
B. The means used by the law to encourage free enterprise is to say to
people that if, in pursuit of their aim, they seek to establish relationships
to their advantage by negotiating and bargaining, the law will help them
(once the negotiating and bargaining has led to a certain relationship)
enforce the promises that other people have made to them; that is, once
the law recognizes that a contract has been formed protection will be given.
Prima facie, therefore, C ought to be given a cause of action against A,
because the best way to support the free enterprise model by law is for
the law to protect free enterprises's ultimate legal product.
The courts' decisions demonstrate that they have--subconsciously
perhaps-adopted this policy. In as much as the foregoing discussion of
the cases has revealed that the courts have made the so-called Lumley v.
Gye tort apply when breaches of contract have been induced, they have
been on philosophically sound ground. And not only will the law help a
promisee to such a contract recover against the inducer of the breach, it
will also permit him to defend the position he has attained by allowing him
to interfere with other people's later acquired inconsistent interests. It has
been seen that the existence of a prior contract permits a promisee to it
to induce a breach of a subsequent inconsistent contract.82 The courts
have gone further at times and permitted a promisee to an existing contract
to induce a breach of a subsequent inconsistent contract even though the
k s t promisee acted in defence of a right which his contract did not give
him. In Short v. The City Bank of Sydney the plaintiff had put his wheat in
storage with a company which provided free storage. In addition, the
storage company offered advances to those people who stored wheat
with it. For these services the company was entitled to a commission on
any wheat it sold out of storage. In order to make the advances it did
make the storage company obtained loans from the City Bank of Sydney
and, by way of security, it gave the Bank, in respect of advances for
which a loan was obtained, a certificate which said that the company held
82
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a certain number of bags of wheat which they would deliver to the Bank's
order on return of the certificates. The plaintiff, as was his right under
the storage agreement, sold some of the wheat he had given to the company
for storage and he requested that it be delivered to his purchaser. By then
the company was in financial difficulties. The plaintiff, whose wheat had
not been specified when in storage (as was none of the stores' wheat)
asked that the Bank release its claim on the wheat so that it could be
consigned as requested. The Bank refused, saying that it had a property
right in the wheat. The company consequently refused to consign any
wheat, as it considered that the Bank had proprietary rights over all the
wheat it held. The plaintiff lost the benefit of his contract for sale and
sued the Bank. He failed on the basis that all that the Bank did was to
insist on what it honestly believed its right to be; it had no intention that
such an insistence should lead to a breach of any particular contract, and
even though its belief that it had a proprietary interest turned out to be
wrongly based in law the Bank could not be made liable for the breach of
contract it caused. Although the holding suggests that perhaps one of
the reasons for the decision was that the defendant had no intent to
induce a breach of the contract because it had no knowledge of its
existence or of its terms, it is difficult to so rationalize the decision as the
plaintiff had actually written to the Bank, detailing its contract of sale to
explain its request for the Bank's release of the wheat stored by the
The fact that to give a cause of action or a right of self-help when a
breach of contract is induced is justifiable on the basis of the guidelines
provided does not mean that the principle underlying these guidelines
requires that every existing contract should attract such protection. Thus
Sleigh v. BlighP can best be rationalized on the ground that the second
contract, having been entered into without knowledge of the first (at least
by the purchaser) was just as good an exercise of free enterprise-and
therefore deserved as much protection-as
the fist, existing contract.
3.s
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(1912) 15 C.L.R. 148. Note also. Blackmore v. Gas Employees' Union (1916) 16
S.R. (N.S.W.) 323. There a trade union had insisted on the dismissal of an
employee who had not become a member of the union within the required period.
This requirement was imposed by an agreement between the union and the
employer. The dispute had arisen because the dismissed plaintiff was a member of
another union which had obtained a preference clause in its favour in an award.
The Court, after some very sophisticated reasoning, came to the conclusion that
the agreement and the award were not inconsistent because they could both
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119691 V.R. 931, supra, fn. 49.
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Indeed, the Court in that case strongly suggested that this was its view,
even though, with typical judicial restraint, it did not say so expressly.
Adam J. stated that "on principle" the tort of wrongful interference with
contractual relations should not be extended to cover cases such as the
one before him. His Honour continued:
"Where, as in the case of a contract to purchase property, a purchaser
being unaware of his vendor's personal obligations under a prior contract
with another, that party thereby innocently acquired contractual rights
against his vendor, but subsequently learns that by completing his
vendor would break his contract with another party, on what rational
principle is he to be denied his . . . right to insist on completion of his
own contract? Although no doubt the case may be clearer where the
subsequent purchaser has no legal escape from his contract, again on
principle it should make no difference, I consider, that his contract may
happen to be voidable by him. After all, a voidable contract is valid
and enforceable, unless, and until avoided at the election of a party
entitled to avoid it, and why should it be considered an unlawful act on
his part if, preferring his own contractual rights, he elects to afIirm the
contract rather than forego them for the benefit of another? In the
conflict in such a case between the third party's own contractual rights
lawfully acquired, and those of the plaintiff, on what principle are the
contractual rights of the plaintiff to be preferred, and the third party's
action in asserting his own contractual rights to be deemed as unlawful
acts?s5
Having discovered no authority for a principle which would make him
decide otherwise, the learned judge found for the defendant. At no stage
did he state the principle on which the defendant was legally permitted to
intentionally induce the breach of the plaintiff's contract, but there can
be little doubt that it was in fact the principle underlying the guidelines
proffered in this section.
That same principle does make it more difficult to base an action where
the injury to the plaintiff occurs because of some induced commercial
disappointment, rather than as a result of an induced breach of contract.
In such a situation it will not be so easy (but not impossible) to establish
that the free enterprise ideals will be promoted by giving a cause of action
to the injured party, the less so when the conduct of the defendant might
itself require protection as being worthwhile conduct in light of the free
enterprise ideal. This was the difficulty in Independent Oil Industry Limited
v. The Shell Company of Australia Limited.86 There the plaintiff had had
an arrangement with retail petrol sellers whereby petrol would be supplied
by the plaintiff provided that the retailers sold it at a price fixed by the
plaintiff. The defendants also sold petrol to the same dealers. Their arrangement was that the retailers had to sell all petrol they sold at a price which
85
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bore a fixed relation to the defendants' price to them; the defendants
reserved the right not to supply any further petrol whenever the price
agreement was not honoured. The defendants put up the price of the
petrol supplied by them; according to the agreement the retailers who
bought from both the plaintiff and the defendants had to sell both sets of
petrol at the defendants' new price. But the plaintiff refused to put up the
price of its petrol. The defendants intimated that they would supply no
more petrol to non-cooperating dealers, and some dealers then told the
plaintiff they would sell no more of the plaintiff's fuel. The plaintiff
brought an action against the defendants for procuring breaches of contract
and failed. On principle this is supportable: both sets of arrangement
appear to have been of equivalent merit in terms of the free enterprise
goals of society and in such a situation it was perhaps best to leave the
plaintiff with its contractual remedy against the dealers in default.87 The
Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the plaintiff failed because
the defendants had not procured the actual breaches. This was so because
the dealers could legitimately have refused to accept any further supplies
from the plaintiff because there were no binding contracts in respect of
such future supplies, merely an understanding that they would continue.
This way out of the dilemma may have been convenient, but is analytically
not too convincing. To come to its decision the Court had to make two
points, neither of which was very persuasive. The .first was that, although
there were contracts breached in as much as some dealers refused to sell
petrol at the plaintiff's price although such petrol had already been bought
by them to sell at this price, the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction
in respect of such breaches because it would be too difficult to know
whether such plaintiff petrol had been bought before or after the
defendants' petrol was affected by the defendants' new pricing policy. The
second point was that, in any event, all that the defendants had done was
to declare their intention to enforce their contract; they had not endeavoured to procure breaches. To make a result depend on this kind of
sophistry is not very satisfactory.
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had managed to conclude a contract with the plaintiff under which the plaintiff
agreed to sell 300 shares in the company to the director at any time within SIX
months that the director might wish to purchase them, such a sale to be made at
sixteen shillings a share. The plaintiff had no shares at the time he entered into this
contract. The defendant subsequently exercised his right under the contract, the
price of the shares having risen substantially. This meant that the plaintiff had to
buy the shares at more than sixteen shillings and sell them to the defendant at
sixteen shillings. The plaintiff alleged that this had happened because the defendant
and his company had by unethical means caused the share price inflation. The
Court held he had no cause of action as no right of his had been violated; that IS,
there had been no procurement of a breach of contract. If the model advocated
had been used the same result would have been reached on the basis that a
gambling contract of this nature (it was so described by the Court) did not do
much for free enterprise and the dubious conduct of the defendant should, despite
its lack of merit, not be treated as if it was contrary to an important mode of
conducting business,

Lumley v. Gye-The

Aftermath

219

Although a weighing of the relative merits of the plaintiffs and the
defendant's enterprises makes it more likely that an existing contract will
be protected by a cause of action than other kinds of commercial interests,
it does not follow that only contractual relationships will be protected if
this test is used. Further, the test does not require that, if it is a contractual
relationship which the plaintiff wants protected, a breach of the contract
has been procured by the defendant; an interference with the contractual
relationship might justify the maintenance of a cause of action in tort.
And again it is found that the test which it is suggested ought to be applied
is not very different from the notions that have implicitly governed the
judiciary's decision-making. Thus there has been liability imposed (without
acknowledgment that the philosophy of promotion of free enterprise is to
be promoted by such imposition) where the interference does not amount
to the procurement of a breach of contractual relations and also where
there has been an interference with relations which do not amount to a
contract.
In Rookes v. Barnardas the House of Lords decided that a certain type
of conduct which resulted in a contractual relationship being ended legally
was actionable at the behest of the disappointed contracting party. To
enable it to do so in the approved manner the House of Lords had to
rely on precedents which had been ignored for a long time. If the test
propounded herein had been used much of the bitterness which that
decision has caused (and is still capable of creating in Australia) could
have been avoided. Thus, if the question the House of Lords has asked
itself had been whether or not the causing of injury without breach of
contract was actionable, (i.e. if the causing of such injury did in fact
detract from the ultimate goal of the promotion of free enterprise), the
answer would have been "Yes", but that in the particular circumstances
of Rookes v. Barnard there would have been no liability because the aim
of promoting free enterprise was not sufficiently undermined by the conduct
of the defendants in Rookes v. Barnard when the injury was compared to
the need for protection of the defendants' conduct. Leaving that for the
moment, the courts freed by the House of Lords from the straitjacket in
which they had put themselves, were quick in asserting the principle that
interferences which did not result in breach of contract could be actionable. But because of the formal way that the House of Lords was forced
to come to its holding, the law has once again become inelastic: bad social
results may be produced because the courts are not likely to feel themselves
at liberty to inquire into the social merit of the conduct of the defendant
in these cases; so far, they have assumed that the defendant's conduct
will be actionable if it is unlawful.89
ss [I9641 A.C. 1129.
s9 Sid Ross Agency Pty. Ltd. v. Actors and Announcers Equity Association o f
Australia [I9711 1 N.S.W.L.R. 760, where unlawful picketing causing the plaintiff
not to enter into further contracts with the plaintiff was held actionable. The trade
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As to the other point, it has already been seen that the law gives a
remedy if the tort of passing-off is committed, that is, although the plaintiff
cannot complain of either a breach of or interference with an enforceable
contract, he does complain of lost business opportunities. In the proposed
formula's jargon, he complains that the interference with his interest will,
if not deterred, detract from the law's efforts to promote free enterprise in
society. The position that the plaintiff wishes to have protected by an
action, he will argue, he has only achieved after participating in free
enterprise activities as society and the law would have him do; accordingly
he deserves the help of the law against interferers who seek to gain a
benefit from his work without having participated in free enterprise in the
same useful way. Once again it may be noted that our courts have acted in
accordance with some such notions. It is no accident, surely, that the
defences available in passing-off actions are in fact defences which promote
free competition. Hence, if a person uses his oam name which is the same
or similar to the name used by another who is already associated with a
particular product, he will not be liable in passing-off because he must be
encouraged to enter into business; the wrong is committed only if he uses
the name in order to profit from the goodwill another's efforts have
obtained for him. The motive of the defendant is, therefore, determinative
of liability?O
Another area that the courts have been forced to handle illogically
because of their adherence to the contract-oriented formula is created by
the following kind of circumstance. Assume that A has heard that B has
contracted to deliver a certain number of power points to C, and A for
business reasons, does not want C to reap the benefit of this contract. A
buys up all the available power points on the market, knowing full well
that B will consequently not be able to discharge his obligation to C.
Should the law protect C by giving him a cause of action against A?
The free enterprise promotion formulation does not make the answer to
this question obvious: it may or may not be to the advantage of free
enterprise to permit A to corner the market to this extent. A great many
more facts would have to be known to make that decision, and a resolution
union motive for so attacking the plaintiffs business was not the subject of judicial
argument. In J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley, 119651 A.C. 269, unlawful acts
procuring breaches of contract and which also interfered with future business
dealings of the plaintiff were held actionable in respect of both sets of injuries.
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Jay's Limited v. Jacobi [I9331 Ch. 411. There have been some commentators who
have doubted whether the plaintiff and defendant actually have to be in competition; see D. L. Mathieson, (1961) 39 Can. B. Rev. 409, and C. L. Pannam,
"Unauthorized Use of Names or Photographs in Advertisements" (1966) 40 A.L.J.
4, but these writers argue that pecuniary loss needs to be shown. That is, if the
plaintiff can show that the use of his name, likeness, "get-up" or whatever, could,
if used by himself, net him a profit, he may recover although he can show no
loss of business or that he was in competition with the defendant in any real
sense; see Henderson v. Radio Corporation Pty. Ltd. (1960) 60 S.R.(N.S.W.) 576.
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without argument or evidence, that A should be enabled to forestall C,
have m o w e d the law relating to inducing breaches of contract by holding
that an indirect inducement of a breach of contract will not be actionable
unless the defendant's conduct was unlawful.92But an unlawful act which
of the problem would differ in differing times?l The courts, assuming,
interferes with a contract may often not be as inimical to the aims of free
enterprise as a lawful act which so interferes. This will be especially so
where the unlawful act in fact furthers another acceptable social objective
such as the viability of a trade union.
It is natural enough that the courts, in cases of an indirect procurement
of a breach of contract, have reached for a "neutral" criterion such an
unlawful act being determinative of actionability. In this way they have
had to make no comparison between the value the law places on the
protection of the contract and any value it might place on the conduct of
the defendant. They merely have had to see whether a contract was
breached as a result of the defendant's unlawful act. And in most cases
this will bring the same result as the balancing test proposed. Typically,
if A physically restrains B from delivering goods to C so that C cannot
perform his contract with D, which result A wished to achieve when he
restrained B, there can be no doubt but that this kind of interference ought
to be actionable on the "promotion of free enterprise" test. It is, of course,
actionable on the "unlawful act indirectly procuring a breach of contract"
test?3 But it goes too far to say, as Jenkins L.J. said in Thomson v. Deakin
that there is
"no distinction in principle for the present purpose between persuading
a man to break his contract with another, preventing him by physical
restraint from performing it, making his performance of it impossible by
taking away or damaging his tools or machinery, and making his performance of it impossible by depriving him, in breach of their contracts,
of the services of his employees."*
In this section the suggestion, so far, has been that the test the courts
ought to use is whether or not the plaintiff's interest is worthy of protection
because it is an interest consonant with the aims of free enterprise and, if
91
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For instance, in mediaeval England it was thought intolerable that dealers and
middlemen should manipulate supplies in order to artificially inflate prices. Prices
were regulated and there were strict laws against the practices of engrossing,
forestalling and regrading: See E. Lipson-The Economic History of England
(9th ed.) pp. 299-307. As this tolerance to "free market" operations waxes and
wanes, the result of the hypothetical case will vary if the kind of test advocated
herein is utilized.
D. C . Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin 119521 Ch. 646. The example used in the
text is taken from the judgment of Lord Evershed M.R., at 680.
Williams v. Hursey (1959) 103 C.L.R. 30 in which physical force was used to
stop the plaintiffs to enter into contracts. See also Keogh v. The Australian
Workers' Union (1902) 2 S.R. (N.S.W.) 265 where unionists waylaid non-unionists
who were on their way to take up employment with an employer with whom the
union were disputing.
[I9521 Ch. 646, 696.
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it is, whether or not the defendant's conduct deserves to be sanctioned
because it does not further those aims as well as does the plaintiff's
enterprise. But there was a qualification added to the basic guidelines,
namely that the law is expected to uphold the free enterprise creed "in as
much as it does not conflict with other known social objectives". There are
other social objectives which the law is to protect and uphold and hence
Jenkins L.J. overstated the case when he said that the means of indirect
interference with a contract was of no consequence as long as it was
unlawful. Just as the promotion of free enterprise requires that noncontractual as well as contractual relationships ought to be protected, it
will be necessary to protect certain kinds of conduct even if they could be
detrimental to efforts to promote the free enterprise ideal.
The courts recognize this need and have permitted the defence of
justification or privilege to succeed in circumstances where there has been
an intentional procurement of a breach of contract. It has been seen that
a father may advise his daughter to break her promise to marry with
impunity. Sometimes it is sought to demonstrate that this is not an attempt
by the courts to inquire into the motive for, and reasonableness of, the
conduct of the inducer at all; after all, if the courts did openly engage in
such inquiries, tortious liability would not depend on such objective
criteria as "breach of contract" or "unlawful act". Thus, Salmond argues
that there is a difference between advising and inducing. For a father to
advise his daughter not to marry a person to whom she is contractually
bound so to do is not actionable if she heeds his advice, for he merely gave
her reasons, which already existed, for breaking the contract. An inducement differs in that the inducer creates reasons to cause another to break
a c o n t r a ~ t . ~ W i the
t h greatest of respect, this line of argument cannot be
accepted. As Willes C.J. said as far back as 1745 " 'procuring' is certainly
'persuading with effect' ".96 The result cannot turn on the manner in which
the defendant caused another person to break a contract; as long as he
intentionally caused the contract to be breached, one of the elements of
the tort is made
Whether or not liability ought to follow ought to
depend on other factors, in particular, on the social merit of the advisor's/
inducer's conduct.
Similarly, the courts have determined that a defendant will be justified
in inducing a breach of contract where his conduct was lawful in the sense
9"almond
on the Law o f Torts, op. cit. p. 379.
96 Winsmore V. Greenbank (1745) 125 E.R. 1330, 1332.
97 See also Payne, "The Tort of Interference with Contract" (1954) 7 Curr. L. Probs. 94.
As the author says at p. 103: "Moreover, if the distinction between inducement
and advice is accepted, what is to be said of the mere advisor who, though he
does not threaten the person advised or actually created new reasons for the
breach he advocates, is nevertheless in a position to visit his displeasure upon the
person advised should his advice not be followed. If causation can in fact be shown
responsibility should follow." Yet the courts have drawn the distinction between
advice and inducement from time to time. Contrast Thomson v. Deakin [I9521
Ch. 646 with Stratford v. Lindley [I9651 A.C. 269 on this point.
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of having been engaged in under the umbrella of statutory authority. James
v. The Commonwealthg8 is an illustration of this attitude. It is worth
pointing out that the action of inducing a breach of contract is made out
when the defendant's act is the direct inducement of the breach even
though the defendant's act is otherwise lawful. That is, statutory authority
ought not to differentiate this lawful act from other lawful acts which are
actionable. Therefore it may be concluded that the courts (in cases like
James v. The Commonwealth) are making a judgment that the defendant's
reliance on a positive enactment of the law indicates that he acted in
furtherance of a social objective which may be assumed to be at least as
worthy of protection as the plaintiff's contract or commercial interest. That
is, they are balancing social objectives.
And again, in cases like Brimelow v. Casson the defendant was excused
because of the plaintiff's exploitation of his employees, but in the
G h o r g a n Miners' case the union's attempt to look after employees'
interest was held not to be justified. This has brought the sharp comment
from Professor Wedderburn that "[s]exual corruption 'justifies' inducing
breach; but starvation wages alone would not".99 And the reason for this
anomaly is clear: because the courts do not openly apply a balancing test, it
is potluck whether or not the defendant's interest and conduct will be held
to have been worthwhile. Thus, the social objective is supporting trade
unions in their activities is not brought into the balance when weighed
against the plaintiff's commercial interest, or if it is, it is often found to be
of little countervailing weight, because the failure to openly apply this
balancing test permits courts to ignore important social evidence. If the
plaintiff's commercial interest, however, is tainted by being associated
with conduct which the courts recognize as something the law clearly will
not support, e.g. causing girls to live "in immorality with a dwarf", then
the balance is weighed in favour of trade union-type activity. This brings
us to the point that all articles on inducing a breach of contract must
eventually discuss: the r61e this area of tort has played in industrial
relations.
The judicial approach to industrial law has often and excellently been
detailed by many writers and it would be superfluous to deal with it again
in this brief space.lW Suffice it to say that trade unionism was seen as a
(1939) 62 C.L.R. 339, above at tgn 43. See also Williams v. Metropolitan &
Export Abbatoirs Board ( 1 9 5 3 ) 89 C.L.R. 66; Stott v. Gamble 119161 2 K.B. 504,
and see Whitfeld v. De Laurent & Co. Ltd. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71 where ~t was
held that, where a State government wheat scheme indirectly prevented shippers
from obtaining a carrying permit from the Commonwealth, the State government
had not caused the loss of which the plaintiff complained. But that, on general
principles, evidence as to what would happen to the wheat crop if the State had
not put its scheme into operation could be given as tending to establish reasonable
cause or excuse for doing the acts complained of.
99 K. W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (2nd ed. London: Macgibbon and
Kee) p.350.
100 Citrine's Trade Union Law (3rd ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell 1967);
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social evil by both legislature and judiciary in England until the early part
of the nineteenth century. Then the legislature came to recognize that
trade union activity served some accepted social purpose and gave trade
unions some legal protection. The judiciary assumed that, in as much as
the legislature had not expressly given protection, trade union activity was
still to be discouraged and they made trade unions liable for engaging in
their collective conduct. The legislature, bit by bit, overcame these legal
barriers to full-blooded trade union activity and, by 1906, the trade
unions were expressly protected from all known tortious causes of acting
which could be used against them.lOlNote that the legislature insisted that
this protection only be provided when the social objectives of the trade
union conduct which led to the plaintiff's injury was of a particular type,
namely when it went to enhance the trade union cause in furtherance of
a trade dispute. That is, the courts were being told quite specifically that
there was a certain kind of social objective which was more worthy of
support than the promotion of competitive enterprise. Where the legislation
had not offered its express protection, the courts restricted trade union
activity considerably. After Allen v. Flood, as has been seen, to act to
the detriment of another was not actionable, even if the harm was intended.
Apparently an independent, unlawful act had to be committed. In Quinn
v. Leathemlo2it was held that, if otherwise lawful acts by a trade unionist
were committed in concert with other individual trade unionists, these
lawful acts were translated into actionable conduct. The tort was known as
a civil conspiracy. This contrasted strangely with the decision in Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Grow & Co.lo3 where it was held that businessmen's concerted action, consisting of lawful acts, taken to protect
their competitive interests was not actionable at the behest of an individual
competitor who was intentionally injured by the combined activity of the
other businessmen. The cases are only distinguishable on the basis that
the social objective of the trade union in Quinn v. Leathem was not
acknowledged to be worthy of legal support, whereas the free enterprisers'
aims in Mogul were. As time went by and the legislature in England made
it clear that combined activity of trade unions in certain contexts was
C. Grunfeld, Modern Trade Union Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell 1966);
K . W . Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, op. cit.; E. I. Sykes, Strike Law in
Australia (Sydney: Law Book Co. 1960); E. I . Sykes and H . J. Glasbeek, Labour
Law in Australia (Sydney: Butterworths 1972); are but a few of the texts which
have dealt with this topic at length.
101
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Highlights o f this development included the Combination Acts of 1799 and
1800-1839 Geo. 3 C. 81 and 39 & 40 Geo. 3. C. 106; partially repealing statutes
of 1824-1825, 5 Geo. 4., C. 95, 6 Geo, 4, C . 119: cases like Hornby v. Close
(1867) 2 Q.B. 153, Walsby v. Anley (1861) 3 E. & E. 516, R. v. Rowlands
(1851) 5 Cox C.C. 466; Royal Commission on Trade Unions 1867, 1871-1876
statutes-Trade Union Acts, 39 & 40 Vict., C. 22; Tag Vale Railway v . Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [I9011 A.C. 426, Trade Disputes Act 1906.
[1901] A.C. 495.
[I8921 A.C. 25.
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socially acceptable, the courts came to terms with this attitude. Thus in
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch,loPthe House of Lords
held that, if the trade union's reason for collective action was to further
its own legitimate interests, the trade union could not be liable in tort for
any injury it had intentionally inflicted by such combination. This formula
recognized that trade unions had legitimate interests to further and it
required the courts to inquire into the motive of the defendants. The
balancing between promoting the plaintiff's right to trade against the
desirability of certain kinds of trade union activity was, in this context at
least, openly condoned. But the judiciary refrained from taking this
approach to its logical conclusion. It is still the law that if the combiners
commit independently unlawful acts no further inquiry into the social
desirability of their combination will be made; it will be actionable if it
causes injury. The underlying reason for this is that if the acts are
unlawful in themselves they must be socially undesirable. Such arbitrary
line-drawing is not very appealing to those who would like the legal system
to attain a measure of justice when resolving disputes.
Let us return to the main theme. The very brief discussion of the
development of trade union law in England demonstrates how the courts
had accepted the promotion of free enterprise as worthy of legal support
but at no stage willingly accepted the furtherance of trade union aims as
being so worthy. How did Lumley v. Gye and its offspring fare in the
industrial relations' area?
When the 1906 Trade Disputes Act was passed it contained a clause
making inducement of a breach of contract or any other interference with
the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right
of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wished,
not actionable provided that such inducement or interference occurred in
the furtherance of a trade dispute.lo5This clear expression of parliamentary
will made trade unions safe from harassment by actions in Lumley v. Gye.
But, as has been seen, in Rookes v. BarnardlOB the House of Lords
reached back and found that there was a cause of action analogous, but
not quite the same, as inducement of a breach of contract. They called it
the tort of intimidation and held that it was made out when a threat of
an unlawful act intentionally caused interference with another's interests,
regardless of whether or not that other's interest was a breach of contract
or not. This made it both more limited (in that it required an unlawful
act) and wider than the tort of inducing a breach of contract (in that it
required no breach of contract), these differences permitting the House of
Lords to say that the statutory protection did not apply. The House of
1m [I9421 A.C. 435.
105 S. 3, Trade Disputes Act 1906 (U.K.).
108 El9641 A.C. 1129; see supra at p. 219.
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Lords ignored the second limb of the statutory protection by reading it as
surplusage.
The case has been much discussed and criticized, and very often the
criticism takes the form of alleging that the House of Lords' bias against
trade unionism caused it to invent brand new tort liability.lo7 This is not
easily proved, but what can be shown is that the ability of courts to hide
behind rationalization techniques enables them to achieve results which the
open application of a balancing test would not permit them to do. Thus,
part of the burden of this article is that there always was a general cause of
action of interference with trade and like interests, and that the restriction
of Lumley v. Gye as a cause of action to the inducement of breaches of
contracts was historically erroneous and wrong in principle. In Rookes v.
Barnard the House of Lords reached back to the general cause of action,
but feeling itself bound to do so in the normal judicial manner, it created
profound discontent.
The courts, prior to Rookes v. Barnard, had reduced the various forms
of tortious liability to specific verbal formulae. The precedent theory gave
these formulations the status of unchallengeable rules: if the criteria spelt
out were established, liability would ensue; it was not the courts' task to
look behind the criteria and seek to satisfy social needs. That, so went
(and goes) the theory, was the legislature's function. The legislature, in
fact, responded by giving protection against the whole of the range of
actions that the verbal formulae had made available against trade unions
and which, if the theory of precedent was honoured, delimited the possible
causes of action. Then the House of Lords held that the legislature had
not covered all contingencies because the known verbal formulations had
not exhaustedly listed all the contingencies. The House of Lords was right
in its finding that there was an historical base for its decision, but the law
was once again seen as being far from evenhanded. There would have been
no, or considerably less, furore if the unlawful act threatened in Rookes v.
Barnard had been that the employer's machinery would be smashed, or
management members attacked unless the offending non-unionist employees
were dismissed. But, in fact, the unlawful act threatened was to break the
contract of employment two of the defendants had with the employer by
striking in defiance of a term of their employment contract. If the balancing
107

Professor Wedderburn has contributed a great deal to the discussion, see, "The
Right to Threaten Strikes" (1961) 24 M.L.R. 572; "The Right to %reaten Strikes
11" (1962) 25 M.L.R. 513; "Intimidation and the Right to S e e " (1964) 27
M.L.R. 257 and also in the text The Worker and the Law, op. crt. Other commentaries include Hamson, "A Note on Rookes v. Barnard" [I9611 C.L.J. 159;
Weir, "Rookes, Stratford and the Economic Torts" [I9641 C.L.J. 225; Cameron,
"Conspiracy and Intimidation, An Anti-Metaphysical Approach" (1965) 28 M.L.R.
448; Smith, "Rookes v. Barnard. An Upheaval in the Common Law Relatmg to
Industrial Disputes" (1966) 40 A.L.J. 81; Hoffman, "Rookes v. Barnard" (1965)
81 L.Q.R. 116, (who also adopts the stance that intimidation is part of an old
and wider action) ;Thomson (1963) 41 Can. Bar Rev. 110.
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test suggested herein had been used, the House of Lords could not possibly
have made the decision it did make in Rookes v. Barnard.
As a matter of logic there is nothing wrong in regarding a breach of
contract as an unlawful act, but what is wrong is to regard the cause of
action now known as intimidation as being founded irrespective of the
nature of the unlawful act. As has been seen, inducements of breaches of
contract intentionally procured have been held non-actionable by courts
where they felt the defendant's conduct was justifiable. The failure to
assess the social merits of the defendants threat to breach their contract in
Rookes v. Barnard shows that the House of Lords either did not believe
that trade union aims were worthy of legal support over and above that
already given by legislation, or else it believed that the cause of action
it had discovered was so well-established that a court could not inquire
into the social effects a literal application of the verbal formula it had
just devised would have. But the literal approach cannot be maintained for
long by the judiciary in any given area because such rigidity inevitably puts
the law out of step with social desires.lo8 The House of Lords made it
virtually impossible by its decision in Rookes v. Barnard, for trade unions
to threaten to call a strike, a weapon that it is essential for trade unionists
to have and the legislature decided not to wait for the courts to invent
qualifications to the tort of intimidation.lm
For another instance of how, in recent years, the courts' theoretical
belief that they need to adhere to verbal formulae without inquiring into
the social merit of people's conduct can cause the legal system to become
anti-social let us consider the short history of Daily Mirror v. Gwdner'lo
in the industrial relations' area. In that case, Lord Denning, as the House
of Lords had done in Rookes v. Barnard, thought that the tort of inducing
a breach of contract was but a manifestation of a general principle of
liability. In particular, he thought that Thomson v. Deakin had stated the
law too narrowly when it was decreed there that an indirect inducement of
a breach of contract would only be actionable if the defendant's act was
independently unlawful. His Lordship said:
"It seems to me that if anyone procures or induces a breach of contract,
whether by direct approach to the one who breaks the contract or by
indirect influence through others, he is acting unlawfully if there be no
sufficientjustification for the interference."lll
Hence the development of defences like justification and the requirement that
where there is an indirect inducement of a breach of contract the defendant's act
will not be actionable unless it was independently unlawful.
109 The legislature stepped in and partially relieved the position, indicating that the
social objectives of trade unionism as practised in Rookes v. Barnard were acceptable to the public-Trade Disputes Act 1965.
llo [I9681 2 Q.B. 762.
111 119681 2 Q.B. 762, 781.
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But in Torquay Hotel v. Cousins,l12 as has been seen,l13 Lord Denning,
faced with a trade union's indirect procurement of interference with commercial relations held that he must have been wrong in the Daily Mirror
case. He thought that he must have been wrong because if he had not
been wrong trade union officials would be prevented from calling strikes,
even lawful ones, because these strikes would always lead to some breach
of contract. This was an unacceptable thought. Hence Lord Denning said
that his verbal formulation had gone too far in opening up liability in
Daily Mirror v. Gardner.l14 It is interesting to note that Lord Denning
held himself to be wrong in law because of the results that might ensue
from a literal application of his words appalled him. Yet his Lordship did
not have to castigate himself so harshly. As has been seen, liability ought
not to depend on the arbitrary distinction between the legality or otherwise
of the defendant's act; a lack of legality may be good evidence that the
defendant's conduct promoted an anti-social aim,l15 but it ought not be
conclusive on this issue and it is this issue-of whether or not the
defendant's conduct was anti-social-which
ought to be determinative of
liability. After all, Lord Denning finished the passage quoted with the
qualifying phrase "if there be no sufficient justification for interference",
which meant that not all procurements or inducements ought to be
actionable. By rejecting the Daily Mirror formulation he freed trade
unions' conduct from some harassment where their procurement of a
breach of contract was indirect, but he emphasized that unlawful inducement and procurements would lead to liability regardless of the nature of
the unlawful act or the motive for doing it. That is, although Lord Denning
saw the need for protecting some kinds of conduct at the expense of the
free enterprise goals of society as promoted by the making of contracts, he
did not feel free to say that a balancing on the basis of social evidence ought
to occur in such cases. Rather he put his faith in a categorization of the
kind which had led to the unpalatable result in Rookes v. Barnard.
In the same way Lord Denning had to retrace his steps in Morgan v.
Fry.l16 In Stratford v. Lindleyn7 Lord Denning himself had said that
whenever men gave notice that they were going to go on strike, they were
giving notice that they were going to break their contracts. This was so
because they intended to pressurize their employer by threatening to not
honour their contractual obligation to work but did not intend to resign.
This meant that when a strike was threatened, an unlawful act was
112
113
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[I9691 2 Ch. 106.
Supra, p. 202.
His Lordship also suggested that the procurement of a breach of contract in
Daily Mirror had been the direct result of the defendant's conduct and that,
therefore, the result had been sound, even if his dictum had not been.
Just as lack of an enforceable contract will be good evidence that the plaintiffs
interest should be upheld because its support promotes a socially desirable aim.
[I9681 2 Q.B. 710.
[I9651 A.C. 269.
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threatened, (for although inducing a breach of contract was not actionable
because of the statute, it was still unlawful) and, therefore, actionable
intimidation had taken place if there was a violation of the plainws interest.
In Morgan v. Fry Lord Denning said that it was "difficult to see the logical
flaw in that argument. But there must be something wrong with it: for . . .
it would do away with the right to strike in this country."118 He then went
on to hold that, as the strike notice was lawful in the case before him, no
unlawful act had been threatened. Further, Lord Denning suggested that
proper notice of a strike was merely a notice to suspend the contract. This
is wrong in principle. As Professor Sykes has said "If all socio-political
reasoning inducing legal phenomena has to have some front of lawyers'
reasoning, here the front becomes the merest facade"?lg But the adoption
of this "front of lawyers' reasoning" enabled Lord Denning to come to the
right result without openly using the kind of balancing test of the kind
offered in this article.
In England the heat has momentarily been taken out of the common law
debate. In 1971 the Industrial Relations Act took away from unregistered
trade unions the legislative protection previously granted against actions
in conspiracy and inducing breach of contract, but all registered trade
unions were to have immunity against all possible common law actions,
provided that they had acted in furtherance of an industrial dispute as
deiined in the Act. That is, the legislature clearly said to the courts: for
unregistered trade unions to act in a particular way is anti-social and you
must deter them; for registered trade unions so to act during industrial disputes is a desirable form of conduct and you must leave them alone. The
balancing had been done by statute. In 1974 a Labor government came
to power and has stated that it will repeal the Industrial Relations Act
of 1971 and in its place extend the former legislative protection (and more)
to trade unions. Past experience should make the legislature wary about
how to draft this legislation.
Whatever the position in England is to become, Australia is, and will
remain for the foreseeable future, a dramatic example of how much out
of step a legal system can get with social requirements when the judiciary
does not accept the responsibility of inquiring into the relative social merit
of the plaintiff's and defendant's enterprise and conduct. This is so because
only Queensland of all the states in Australia has extended the legislative
protection afforded to English trade unions by the Trade Disputes Act
1906. In all the other states trade unions are wide open to actions in
conspiracy and inducing breach of contract. As the Australian judiciary
has accepted the law as stated in England and uses the same technique,
(namely, merely looks to see whether the technical requirements of the
1
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tort are fulfilled), it would be very easy to completely hamstring all union
activity. The more so because in all states but Victoria strikes are made
illegal to a greater or lesser extent by statute. And, at federal level, strike
action may be made a breach of an award by the insertion of a bans
clause. That is, the unlawful act necessary to found conspiracy by unlawful
means, indirect inducement of breach of contract and intimidation will be
easily established.120
To merely inquire into whether or not the technical criteria have been
established is particularly short-sighted in the Australian context. For the
judiciary could hardly be furnished with more evidence than is available
to come to the view that trade union activity is very much desired by our
community. Thus, at the federal level, registration of trade unions has
been encouraged to such a marked degree that we have become one of
the most unionized countries in the world. These unions are required
because the industrial relations' system we have developed is dependent on
having entities which can be made parties to enforceable, imposed awards.
At the same time we urge the participants in industrial relations to
collectively bargain. This necessitates the use by these participants of
economic force and thus, by trade unions, cd conspiring to hurt the
employer and to induce breaches of his contracts or generally to interfere
with his commercial interests. Four of the states have systems analogous
to the federal one and in the remaining two, Victoria and Tasmania, the
role of trade unions is also seen as significant. That is, right along the line
there is, for everyone to see, an encouragement to trade unions to make
themselves stronger numerically and to use their power to withhold labour
when engaging in the desirable activity of bargaining.
In this framework it is difficult to applaud courts for just looking at a
dispute between a trade union and an employer as if it were a dispute
which can simply be symbolized by using letters as substitutes for the
parties involved, disregarding the characters of the disputants. That is, if
a union seeks to make an employer employ trade unionists only, an aim
that is in keeping with the encouragement of trade unionism, it is simply
not good enough to say that this is a dispute between A who persuaded B
not to perform his contract with C unless D dismissed X, and that, where
A used unlawful means, he will be liable in tort on one of several counts
(conspiracy if A is more than one, intimidation or inducement of breach
of contract). The question ought to be whether the union's aim is a
desirable one, and if so, whether the means used to achieve if were of the
kind which ought to be protected from legal action, taking into account
the need to protect the rights violated. But the courts will not do this, as
the recent case of Woolley v. Dunsf0r61~ldemonstrates. There a decision

" See
generally Sykes & Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia, op. cit.; Sykes, Strike
Law in Australia, o p . cit.
119721 3 S.A.S.R. 243.
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was made that the union, by imposing a black ban on an employer's goods
in order to cause that employer to get his employees to join the union,
had induced a breach of contract. The employer's contracts were breached
because a shipping company refused to handle his wool when informed of
the black ban. An order was made against the union. Most of the report
of the case is made up by the Court's careful evaluation of mountains of
evidence about whether the defendant's conduct caused the shipping
company to breach the contract and whether or not there was a contract.
It is suggested that it would not have been any more arduous for the court
to take the position that the decision should be made on the basis of the
relative merits of the enterprise and conduct of the parties, the social value
of the trade union activity being well-documented and other relevant social
evidence being readily a~ailab1e.l~~
A brief point is to be made in respect of the earlier comment that if
the judicial approach presently employed persists, the position will not
alter. This will be so despite the present federal government's announced
intention to provide protection on the English legislative model basis.lz3
Even if such legislation is enacted, and even if it is held to be constitutionally
it will apply to federally registered trade unions acting in the
federal sphere of labour regulation. At the State level, no immunity will
have been created.
Should the courts be permitted to consider the difficulties arising out of
the use of power by trade unions as if they were no different from the
actions of an individual who, for private gain or malice, seeks to interfere
with the legitimate interests of another? Is the value of having the judicial
system appear to be bound by rules and, therefore, objective, not outweighed by the inevitable creation of the kinds of problems outlined in
this section if this judicial method is adopted?
A Summation
1. The courts should be asked to strike a balance between competing
interests on the basis of the social desirability of those aims. An acceptable
starting point at this moment in time is that endeavours which promote
free enterprise activity should be supported by the law by imposing liability
on those who interfere with such endeavours. It follows that, although the
existence of a contract will be strong evidence that the plaintiff's interest
Other cases which were decided by artificial criteria included McKernan v.
Fraser, Bond v. Morris and Williams v. Hursey, discussed supra. In all three
cases the court spent a good deal of time discussing whether or not it was a
contract which had been interfered with.
12-3 In 1973 such legislation was offered but was not passed into legislation.
124 It can only be valid if it is adjudged incidental to the power of conciliation and
arbitration. The registration of trade unions is permissible as being incidental to
that power, that is, to make implementation of that power more efficient. Quaere:
whether the granting of immunity to tort actions in order to make registered
trade unions more efficient is incidental (within the meaning of the Constitution)
to the conciliation and arbitration power,
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should be protected, not only contractual interests will be protected, nor
will actual breaches of contract be necessary. In any event, the Lumley V.
Gye "tort" has been wrongly restricted to inducing breaches of contract.
2. Not all interferences with endeavours which promote free enterprise
should attract liability. There should be no such liability if the interference
is the natural result of the promotion of a socially desirable aim. The
courts will need to obtain evidence to enable them to decide between the
relative desirability of the two conflicting aims. Whether or not the
interference is the result of an independently unlawful activity is not
determinative of this issue; but if the conduct is truly reprehensible, e.g.,
the use of violence to achieve a socially desirable aim, this must be taken
into account in applying the balancing test.
3. The courts have clearly accepted that endeavours which promote free
enterprise are worthy of being protected by the law especially by making an
action available where there is no inducement of a breach of contract.
They have also recognized that some countervailing objectives may override
such protection. In view of this it can legitimately be said that they assume
certain social facts and desiderata when facing the kinds of dispute discussed in this article. It is therefore not legitimate to argue that they
should not take their position to its logical conclusion; nor should they be
permitted to continue to hide behind the pretence that only the legislature
can and does build policy into the law.
4. There is no question but that to balance competing interests and
codicting social aims will be very difficult. It will be difficult to get the
right kind of evidence before the courts. For example, it was seen that
in Independent Oil Industries Ltd. v. The Shell Co. of Australia Ltd.125
there was no convincing reason why either one of the parties should be
favoured on policy basis. But this is no reason for saying that the courts
should decide cases without regard to policy reasoning of the kind
advocated. If they do so, the results will only look more objectively
reached; they will not be more objective, nor more just. To say that it is
not proper for the courts to delve into social data is to say that the lady
who represents justice is blind-folded because she wants to make her
decisions in ignorance, rather than by treating disputes on their real merits.
This is not a new-fangled thesis advocated only by academics who do
not have to deal with the realities of administering a legal system. It was
stated, much better than I have been able to do it, eighty years ago, by
one of the greatest common law judges of all times. Thus spoke Oliver
Wendell Holmes:
"But whether, and how far, a privilege shall be allowed is a question of
policy. Questions of policy are legislative questions, and judges are shy
of reasoning from such grounds. Therefore, decisions for or against the
125
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privilege, which really can stand only upon such grounds, often are
presented as hollow deductions from empty general propositions like
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which teaches nothing but a
benevolent yearning, or else are put as if they themselves embodied a
postulate of the law and admitted of no further deduction. . . . When the
question of policy is faced it will be seen to be one which cannot be
answered by generalities, but must be determined by the particular
character of the case. . . . I do not try to mention or to generalize all
the facts which have to be taken into account; but plainly the worth
of the result, or the gain from allowing the act to be done, has to be
compared with the loss which it inflicts. Therefore, the conclusion will
vary, and will depend on different reasons according to the nature of
the
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Hdmes, "Privilege, Malice and Intent" (1894) 8 Harv. L.R. 13.

